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People form moral impressions rapidly, effortlessly, and from a remarkably young age1–5. 
Putatively “bad” agents command more attention and are identified more quickly and 
accurately than benign or friendly agents5–12. Such vigilance is adaptive, but can also be costly 
in environments where people sometimes make mistakes, because incorrectly attributing bad 
character to good people damages existing relationships and discourages forming new 
ones13–16. The ability to accurately infer others’ moral character is critical for healthy social 
functioning, but the computational processes that support this ability are not well 
understood. Here we show that moral inference is explained by an asymmetric Bayesian 
updating mechanism where beliefs about the morality of bad agents are more uncertain (and 
thus more volatile) than beliefs about the morality of good agents. This asymmetry appears 
to be a property of learning about immoral agents in general, as we also find greater 
uncertainty for beliefs about bad agents’ non-moral traits. Our model and data reveal a 
cognitive mechanism that permits flexible updating of beliefs about potentially threatening 
others, a mechanism that could facilitate forgiveness when initial bad impressions turn out to 
be inaccurate. Our findings suggest that negative moral impressions destabilize beliefs about 
others, promoting cognitive flexibility in the service of cooperative but cautious behavior. 
 
Signs of bad character capture attention9–12 because people are strongly motivated to avoid 
being exploited by others16,17. However, erroneously inferring bad character can lead people to 
prematurely terminate valuable relationships and thereby miss out on the potential benefits of 
future cooperative interactions13–16. Thus, successfully navigating social life requires strategies 
for maintaining social relationships even when others behave inconsistently and sometimes 
commit immoral acts. 
 
One possible strategy is to respond to defection with probabilistic cooperation18. Evolutionary 
models show such “generous” strategies outcompete strategies that summarily end 
cooperative relationships in the face of a single betrayal19,20. Generous strategies are also 
observed in humans playing repeated prisoner’s dilemmas where others’ intended actions are 
implemented with noise20. Although evolutionary and economic models provide descriptive 
accounts of these behaviors, the cognitive mechanisms that enable them are not well 
understood. In particular, the computational processes that support adaptive moral inference 
in humans are unknown. 
 
We propose that when people form beliefs about others’ moral character, their impressions 
about bad agents are more uncertain than their impressions about good agents. This makes 
impressions about bad agents more amenable to Bayesian updating, by which belief updates 
are proportional to the uncertainty of beliefs in accordance with Bayes’ rule21. Our hypothesis is 
based on evidence that threatening social stimuli are arousing22, and that arousal increases 
belief uncertainty in non-social perceptual learning23. This evidence suggests that threatening 
social stimuli (such as agents with inferred bad character) might induce belief uncertainty. Our 
proposal provides a possible solution for maintaining social relationships when others 
sometimes act immorally by enabling negative impressions to be more easily revised: if beliefs 
about putatively “bad” agents are volatile, such beliefs could be readily updated if the initial 
impression turned out to be mistaken.  
 
At first blush, our hypothesis may appear inconsistent with decades of research in social 
psychology, much of which has examined impression formation from narrative descriptions of 
extreme and rare behaviors, such as theft or violence. This work provides evidence for a 
negativity bias in impression formation, where people update their moral impressions to a 
greater degree from negative relative to positive information9,12,24. The primary explanation for 
this valence asymmetry is that it reflects a differential diagnosticity of immoral vs. moral 
behaviors: bad people often behave morally, but good people rarely behave immorally9. 
Indeed, recent work has suggested that valence asymmetries in impression updating can be 
explained by perceptions of how rare immoral behaviors are, relative to moral ones25. This 
leaves open the question of whether people actually learn differently about agents inferred to 
be more vs. less moral when their actions are equally diagnostic of their underlying character. 
This is the central question we addressed in the current studies. We focused on moral inference 
from behaviors that are not extreme or definitive of character. Such behaviors comprise the 
vast majority of our daily social interactions: we most often judge others based on behaviors 
that are nasty or nice, not evil or saintly. Inferring character from minor slights or small favors is 
considerably more difficult than doing so from criminal deeds or heroic actions, but our success 
as a social species suggests we are nevertheless able to do this effectively.   
 
We developed an approach to investigate the computational basis of moral inference and its 
temporal dynamics. Participants predicted and observed the choices of two “agents” who 
repeatedly decided whether to inflict painful electric shocks on another person in a different 
room in exchange for money (Fig. 1a). We generated agent behavior using a model that 
accurately captures typical preferences in this choice setting26,27. The model includes a “harm 
aversion” parameter, κ, which quantifies the subjective cost of harming the victim as an 
exchange rate between money and pain and ranges from 0 (profit maximizing) to 1 (pain 
minimizing) (Supplementary Figure 1). Because ethical systems universally judge harming 
others for personal gain as morally wrong28, we operationalized moral character as harm 
aversion in our paradigm. The two agents differed substantially in their harm aversion, with the 
“good” agent requiring more compensation per shock to inflict pain on others than the “bad” 
agent (bad: κ =0.3 or £0.43 per shock; good: κ =0.7 or £2.40 per shock; Fig. 1b). The preferences 
of the good and bad agents were symmetric around participants’ expectations of “average” 
behavior, which was not significantly different from κ =0.5 (see Supplementary Materials, Study 
8 for details). 
 Figure 1. Learning task and model. (A) Participants predicted sequences of choices for two agents, “Decider 
A” and “Decider B”. On each trial, the agent chose between a more harmful (more shocks inflicted on 
another person for more money) and a less harmful (fewer shocks/money) option. After every third trial, 
participants rated their impression of the agent’s moral character. In Studies 2 to 5, participants also rated 
the uncertainty of their impression. For each study, the learning task used local currency (GBP for study 1, 
USD for studies 2-8). (B) Heat maps summarize the bad and good agent’s probability of choosing the more 
harmful option as a function of money gained and shocks delivered. (C) Model schematic for learning about a 
good agent. Beliefs about moral character are represented by probability distributions. The mean of the 
distribution (μ) describes the current belief about the agent after trial t, and the variance of the distribution 
(σ) describes the current uncertainty on that belief. Beliefs evolve over time as a Gaussian random walk 
whose step-size is governed by ω, a participant-specific parameter that captures individual differences in 
belief volatility.  
 
On each trial, participants predicted the choice made by the agent and received immediate 
feedback on their accuracy. After every third trial, participants rated their subjective 
impressions of the agent’s morality on a scale ranging from “nasty” to “nice” and rated how 
uncertain they were about their impression on a scale ranging from “very certain” to “very 
uncertain”.  
 
We modeled participants’ predictions for each agent separately with a Bayesian learning 
model21 that generated a trial-wise sequence of belief estimates about each agent’s character 
(i.e., the exchange rate between money and pain, µ); a trial-wise sequence of uncertainties on 
those beliefs (σ); and a global estimate of belief volatility (ω) that describes the rate at which 
beliefs evolve over time (Fig. 1c).. Belief volatility is set in log space and is monotonically related 
to belief uncertainty (i.e., more uncertain beliefs are more volatile21; for example, a change in ω 
from -3.5 to -4.0 corresponds to a 20% decrease in the average variance of posterior beliefs, σ.) 
We report ω here; see Supplementary Information and Supplementary Table 1 for results for 
trial-wise uncertainty σ.  
 
Formal model comparisons indicated that our model outperformed simpler Rescorla-Wagner 
models that do not account for uncertainty in beliefs (see Supplementary Materials, Study 1, 
and Supplementary Table 2 for details). To test our hypothesis that character ratings and 
model parameter estimates µ and ω will differ between good and bad agents, we compared 
them using two-tailed non-parametric statistical tests that do not make assumptions about 
underlying distributions of the character ratings and parameter estimates. We report means 
and standard error of the mean (sem) as mean±sem.  
 
Our approach extends previous methods employed to probe impression formation in several 
ways. First, because our paradigm used a computational model of moral preferences rather 
than narrative descriptions of behaviors (as in past social psychology research), we were able to 
very tightly control how informative agents’ behaviors were with regard to their underlying 
preferences. We precisely matched the trial sequences with respect to how much information 
was provided about each agent’s character over the course of learning (see Supplementary 
Materials, study 1 for details). In this way, we ensured that the statistics of the environment did 
not advantage learning about either the good or bad agent, and this symmetry was confirmed 
by the fact that an ideal Bayesian observer learned identically about the good and bad agents 
(Supplementary Table 3). Because of this design feature, we can confidently infer that the 
belief asymmetries we observed in our studies were not due to asymmetries in the information 
we provided to participants (in contrast to past studies using narrative descriptions of 
behaviors, where moral information was evaluated as less diagnostic than immoral 
information25). Second, in contrast to past work, which focused on descriptive measures over 
relatively few trials, our methods allowed us to measure the dynamics of impression formation 
over time. Finally, our paradigm allowed us to measure the uncertainty and volatility of 
people’s impressions in addition to the valence of those impressions, which has been the 
primary focus of past work. By doing so, we are able to bridge our investigation of moral 
inference with foundational work on perceptual and reinforcement learning21,23 and show that 
similar computational principles underlie learning across these diverse domains29–31. 
 
In an initial study (Study 1) we measured moral inference in 38 participants in the lab. Our 
model fit participants’ predictions well, explaining behavior with 87% accuracy on average 
(Supplementary Table 4). Participants accurately inferred the bad agent was less moral than 
the good agent, as evident in subjective character ratings (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, final 
character rating: bad = 42.663±4.021; good = 78.831±2.869; P<0.001; Supplementary Table 5) 
and the model’s estimates of beliefs (final µ: bad = 0.332±0.004; good = 0.681±0.004; P<0.001; 
Supplementary Table 1).  
 
As predicted, beliefs about the morality of bad agents were more volatile than beliefs about 
good agents (ω: bad = -3.779±0.102; good = -4.212 ±0.104; P=0.001; Supplementary Table 1). 
Participants were consciously aware of this asymmetry, as they rated their impressions of the 
bad agent as more uncertain than their impressions of the good agent (mean uncertainty 
rating: bad = 28.623±2.428; good = 20.612±2.367; P<0.001; Supplementary Table 5 and 6) We 
found that the difference in the volatility of beliefs about the good and bad agents’ moral 
character was significantly larger for participants compared to an ideal Bayesian observer (Δω: 
participants = 0.433±0.121; Bayesian = 0.015±0.011; P<0.001, Supplementary Table 3). Thus, 
the asymmetry we observe in moral learning cannot be due to the statistics of the 
environment. 
 In a second study (N = 163), we sought to replicate our findings in a larger and more diverse 
sample and to test whether participants’ moral impressions of the two agents affected their 
social behavior by inviting them to entrust money to each agent in a one-shot trust game after 
learning about both agents (see Supplementary Materials, study 2 for details). Replicating our 
previous results, participants accurately inferred that the bad agent was less moral than the 
good agent (final µ: bad = 0.301±0.004; good = 0.707±0.003, P<0.001; character rating: bad = 
42.227±1.962; good = 80.706±1.444, P<0.001; Fig. 2a and Supplementary Table 1 and 5). 
Participants also entrusted the good agent with twice as much money as the bad agent, 
demonstrating that these moral impressions are relevant to social economic decisions (amount 
entrusted: bad = 3.36±0.30; good = 7.15±0.29; P<0.001; Fig. 2b and Supplementary Table 7). As 
in the first study, beliefs about the moral character of the bad agent were more uncertain and 
volatile than beliefs about the good agent (mean uncertainty rating: bad = 33.078±1.330; good 
= 24.078±1.371; P<0.001; ω: bad = -3.411±0.051; good = -3.877±0.051; P<0.001; Fig. 2c-d, 
Supplementary Table 1 and 5). Our model predicts that there would be larger trial-wise 
updating of character ratings for the bad agent than the good agent. This was confirmed in a 
model-free analysis where we compared the magnitude of changes in trial-to-trial ratings 
between good and bad agents (see Supplementary Materials, study 2 and Supplementary Table 
8). 
 Figure 2. Asymmetry in moral impression formation, Study 2. (A) Trajectory of subjective character ratings 
over time in Study 2, averaged across participants (N=163 for all panels). (B) In a one-shot trust game, 
participants entrusted the good agent with twice as much money as they did the bad agent. (C) Trajectory of 
subjective uncertainty ratings over time, averaged across participants. Subjects reported greater uncertainty 
about bad agents. (D) Volatility of beliefs (ω in the model) was higher for the moral character of the bad 
compared to the good agent. Error bars and shaded bounds in trajectories represent SEM. ***P < 0.001 
 
In a third study (N = 135), we increased the stochasticity of agent choices to test whether the 
differences we observed for learning about bad compared to good agents are robust to noisy 
environments. We replicated all the findings from Studies 1 and 2 (see Supplementary 
Materials, Study 3, Supplementary Tables 1 and 5), including the key result that beliefs about 
the moral character of bad agents are more volatile than those about good agents (ω: bad = -
3.468±0.042; good = -3.974±0.043; P<0.001). Furthermore, to ensure that our findings in 
Studies 1-3 were not an artifact of the scale participants used to rate the agents’ morality 
(ranging from nasty to nice), we replicated all findings in a supplementary study using an 
alternative scale (ranging from bad to good; see Supplementary Materials, Study 7, and 
Supplementary Tables 1 and 5). 
 
One possible explanation for why people form more uncertain beliefs about the moral 
character of bad than good agents is a strong prior expectation that people will behave 
morally32,33, thus rendering the bad agent’s behavior more surprising. To investigate this 
possibility, we asked a separate group of participants to predict, in the context of decisions to 
profit from others’ pain, how “most people” would choose (see Supplementary Materials, study 
8). This allowed us to estimate participants’ expected level of harm aversion (κ) within the 
context of our task. No feedback was provided to participants during the task, but to motivate 
accurate predictions participants received a financial bonus for each trial where they 
successfully predicted the majority response. We found no evidence that people expect others 
to behave more like the good agent. In fact, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the expected 
κ came from a distribution with a median (κ = 0.5) equidistant from that of the good and bad 
agents (mean expected κ = 0.445, one sample signed-rank test, P=0.178).  These results suggest 
that our observation of more uncertain beliefs about the morality of bad agents cannot be fully 
attributed to prior beliefs about the morality of others. 
 In addition, we measured participants’ beliefs about the agents’ character prior to starting the 
learning task. If the asymmetry in learning is explained by prior expectations that people will 
behave morally, then this asymmetry should be larger when people expect others to be nicer. 
However, we found no relationship between prior expectations about the agents’ moral 
character and between-agent differences in our key dependent measures, such as ω and 
subjective uncertainty ratings (see Supplementary Materials, Study 2 and Supplementary Table 
9 and Supplementary Figure 2). We also did not find a relationship between learning 
asymmetries and self-reports of generalized trust in others (see Supplementary Materials, 
Study 8 and Supplementary Figure 3). 
 
In a fourth study (N=220), we examined whether the asymmetry in learning about bad 
compared to good agents extend to learning about a trait unrelated to morality. If the 
asymmetry is specific to moral impressions, then it should be larger when learning about moral 
character than when learning about a non-moral trait such as competence. To test this, we 
randomized participants into either a morality condition (N=109; Fig. 3a) or a competence 
condition (N=111; Fig. 3b). In the morality condition, participants predicted the moral choices 
of a bad and a good agent as before. In the competence condition, participants predicted the 
basketball performance (number of points scored per minute) of a low-skill and a high-skill 
agent. Crucially, task parameters were precisely matched across conditions so that an ideal 
Bayesian observer would learn identically in all cases, permitting direct comparison of model 
estimates and subjective ratings. We chose to examine learning about basketball ability rather 
than other traits related to competence, such as intelligence or social ability, because previous 
work has shown that the latter are not independent of impressions of moral character34. In 
contrast, we expected inferences about basketball ability to be independent from inferences 
about moral character. Pilot testing supported this claim (See Supplementary Materials, study 
4). Thus, our design allowed us to directly test the specificity of our observed effect for moral 
inference because it is unlikely participants would form moral impressions from observations of 
basketball performance alone. 
 
 
Figure 3. Forming impressions of morality vs. competence, Study 3. (A) In the morality condition, 
participants (N=109) predicted whether the agent would deliver a certain number of shocks for a specified 
profit. (B) In the competence condition, participants (N=111) predicted whether the agent would succeed in 
scoring a certain number of points within a specified amount of time. (C) Interaction between agent 
(bad/low-skill vs. good/high-skill) and condition (morality vs. competence) for the volatility of beliefs (ω in the 
model). Error bars represent SEM. ***P < 0.001; n.s. = not significant 
 
As predicted, between-agent differences in uncertainty ratings and belief volatility were 
significantly larger in the morality condition than the competence condition (rank sum test, 
difference in mean uncertainty rating: morality = 4.870±1.467, competence = -2.778±1.161, 
P<0.001; difference in ω: morality = 0.316±0.069, competence = -0.060±0.069, P<0.001). 
Participants’ beliefs about bad agents were more uncertain and volatile than beliefs about good 
agents (mean uncertainty rating: bad = 29.335±1.598; good = 24.166±1.607, P<0.001; ω: bad = -
4.390±0.064; good = -4.714±0.048, P<0.001; Supplementary Tables 1 and 5), but there was no 
difference in the volatility of beliefs about low-skill and high-skill agents (mean uncertainty 
rating: low-skill = 18.457±1.227; high-skill = 20.653±1.274, P=0.076; ω: low-skill = -4.726±0.047; 
high-skill = -4.655±0.057,  P=0.566; Fig. 3c). 
 
Previous work has shown bad behaviors carry more weight than good behaviors in moral 
impression formation9,10,12,25. In our studies, the bad agent by definition makes more immoral 
choices than the good agent, and so we cannot be sure that the observed asymmetry in 
learning is driven by inferences about the moral character of the good and bad agents rather 
than responses to the choices that good and bad agents make. We predicted that the 
threatening nature of bad agents would increase the uncertainty and volatility of beliefs, 
thereby destabilizing beliefs in a non-specific manner. This prediction is consistent with past 
literature showing that task-irrelevant threatening cues increase attention and information 
processing35. If inferring bad moral character exerts a global effect on social impression 
formation, then beliefs about other traits, such as competence, should also be more volatile for 
agents that are believed to be immoral. We tested this hypothesis in a fifth study where 
participants (N=189) simultaneously inferred the morality and competence of a good and bad 
agent with similar levels of competence (Fig. 4a). Supporting our hypothesis, participants 
formed more volatile beliefs about the bad agent’s morality and competence, relative to the 
good agent (Fig. 4b; moral ω: bad = -4.116±0.046; good = -4.428±0.039, P<0.001; competence 
ω: bad = -4.224±0.039; good = -4.327±0.034, P=0.002; Supplementary Table 1). Moral 
impressions also affected participants’ own conscious awareness of the uncertainty of their 
beliefs: participants expressed greater uncertainty in their impressions of the bad agent’s 
morality and competence (moral uncertainty rating: bad = 27.880±1.019; good = 24.209±1.027, 
P<0.001; competence uncertainty rating: bad = 28.875±1.995; good = 27.277±1.992, P=0.020; 
Supplementary Table 5).  
 
 
Figure 4. Inferences about moral character affect learning about non-moral traits and impression updating. 
(A) In study 5, participants experienced trial sequences with interleaved morality (Fig. 3a) and competence 
trials (Fig. 3b). Participants rated their impressions of and uncertainty about the agents’ moral character and 
skill level after every third morality and competence trial, respectively. (B) Comparison of volatility of beliefs 
about the good and bad agent’s morality (left) and competence (right) in Study 5, N=189. (C) In Study 6, 
participants were randomized to learn about a bad agent (κ=0.3) or a good agent (κ=0.7) whose moral 
character either improved (κ+0.2) or worsened (κ–0.2). (D) In Study 6, participants more strongly updated 
their impressions of bad than good agents when moral character improved but not when it worsened 
(N=364). Error bars represent SEM. **P < 0.01, ***P < 0.001 
 
Our results suggest that impressions of bad agents are more rapidly updated in the face of new 
evidence than impressions of good agents. We hypothesized that this mechanism would enable 
people to rapidly revise an initially bad impression of another person if their behavior 
subsequently improves. To test this, in a final preregistered study we examined how people 
update their impressions of bad and good agents following a shift in their behavior 
(https://osf.io/5s23d/ ). Participants (N=364) were randomized to learn about an agent who 
was initially either bad or good, but then began to make choices that were consistently either 
more or less moral than previously (Fig. 4c and Supplementary Materials, study 6). In this study 
we explicitly set participants’ prior beliefs at k = 0.5 by instructing them that “on average, 
people require $1 per additional shock to the ‘victim’”. Because beliefs about bad agents are 
more volatile, we predicted that participants would more strongly update their impressions of 
bad agents than good agents. We tested our hypothesis by comparing, for bad vs. good agents, 
the extent to which participants updated their impressions, defined as the difference between 
character ratings before vs. after the agents’ preferences shifted. Because this study 
investigated how people update character impressions in response to contradictory 
information, the design most closely resembled those implemented in past social psychology 
studies24,25. 
 
As predicted, we observed a main effect of agent on impression updating, where participants 
updated their character ratings more for bad good than agents (rank sum, update: bad = 
18.951±1.245, good = 14.928±1.316, P<0.001). There was also a main effect of shift direction: 
updating was greater when morality worsened than when it improved (rank sum, update: 
worsen = 22.083 ±1.389; improve = 11.468 ±1.010, P<0.001). This is consistent with past reports 
of negativity bias in impression formation9–11, where people show stronger impression updating 
in response to inconsistent immoral behaviors relative to moral behaviors. Main effects were 
qualified by an interaction between agent and shift direction (Kruskal-Wallis, P<0.001), where 
asymmetric updating was more pronounced when morality improved than when morality 
worsened (Fig. 4d). At first glance, this interaction may appear surprising, because our model 
only predicts a main effect of agent and does not differentiate between positive and negative 
updating. However, our theoretical framework proposes that people form more volatile beliefs 
about putatively bad agents due to an adaptive mechanism whereby potentially threatening 
cues increase attention and learning. Thus, when a “good” agent’s behavior suddenly worsens, 
participants may infer a potential threat, prompting their beliefs about the agent to become 
more uncertain and amenable to rapid updating. Consistent with these predictions, the degree 
of impression updating tracked with participants’ change in subjective ratings of uncertainty 
before vs. after the agents’ behavior shifted (Spearman’s ρ, P = 0.006; Supplementary 
Materials, study 6).  
 
We have demonstrated in six studies that bad moral impressions are more volatile than good 
moral impressions. Furthermore, inferring bad character destabilized overall social impression 
formation, spilling over into learning about a non-moral trait. When moral behavior improved, 
impressions were updated faster for putatively bad agents than good agents. Thus, the volatility 
of bad moral impressions may facilitate forgiveness by enabling initially bad impressions to be 
rapidly updated if behavior improves.  
 
Despite the robustness of our findings, our paradigm has an important limitation: accepting 
money in exchange for shocks that are painful but not dangerous is a relatively mild moral 
transgression. Mild transgressions represent the vast majority of transgressions that will be 
personally experienced by most individuals, and thus the mechanisms we identify may explain 
everyday changes in beliefs about the moral character of others. However, it is unclear how 
these results will generalize to learning about more extreme transgressions, such as assault, 
rape, or murder.  
 
Although theoretical models of person perception have claimed the independence of trait 
dimensions (namely warmth and competence)1, other evidence suggests that judgments across 
trait dimensions may share a positive relationship34,36. Our work lends further support to the 
possibility that the cognitive processing of different traits belonging to the same individual are 
related, and offers tools for addressing this question. By considering uncertainty of beliefs in 
addition to valence, future work may shed new light on how the mechanisms supporting 
different dimensions of person perception relate to one another. 
 
Overall, our findings are consistent with research identifying a negativity bias in impression 
formation, where bad behaviors command more attention than good behaviors9–12, and 
research showing that uncertain attitudes are susceptible to change37. Taken together, our 
results extend this literature to show that when considered within a Bayesian learning 
framework, a negativity bias naturally makes impressions more volatile, where impressions 
about bad agents are more rapidly updated than impressions about good agents. We suggest 
that by destabilizing overall impressions of others, the learning mechanism described here 
promotes cognitive flexibility in the service of building richer models of potentially threatening 
others. This mechanism provides an algorithmic solution to the problem of moral inference in a 
world where people sometimes make mistakes, and helps resolve the paradox of how people 
can forgive despite the potency of negative information in judging the moral character of 
others.  
 
Methods: 
 
The research was approved by the Medical Sciences Interdivisional Research Ethics Committee, 
University of Oxford (Study 1, MSD-IDREC-C1-2015-001; Studies 2-8, MSD-IDREC-C1-2015-098). 
All participants provided informed consent and were compensated for their time. For each 
study, the learning task used local currency (GBP for study 1, USD for studies 2-8). 
 
For Study 1, 39 participants were recruited from the University of Oxford subject pool. One 
participant was excluded from the analysis as their performance was below chance in the 
learning task (<50% accuracy). For Study 2, 253 participants were recruited from Amazon 
Mechanical Turk (AMT), and 87 were excluded for below-chance performance. For Study 3, 162 
participants were recruited from AMT, and 27 were excluded for below-chance performance. 
All participants from Studies 1-3 completed a learning task that involved predicting sequences 
of moral decisions made by two agents who differed in their moral character (Fig. 1a). 
Throughout the task, participants indicated their impression of the agents’ moral characters (on 
a scale from nasty to nice) and how certain they were about this impression. To motivate 
accurate performance, participants in Studies 2 and 3 were instructed they would later decide 
whether to trust each of the agents in a one-shot trust game that could earn them additional 
money. 
  
For Study 4, 280 participants were recruited from AMT and randomly assigned to complete 
either a moral learning task or a competence learning task (Fig. 3a-b). In the morality condition, 
participants predicted the moral choices of two agents who differed in moral character. In the 
competence condition, participants predicted the basketball performance of two agents who 
differed in skill level.  For Study 4, 31 participants from the morality condition and 29 
participants from the competence condition were excluded for below-chance performance. To 
motivate accurate predictions, participants received a monetary bonus for high accuracy. 
 
For Study 5, 259 participants were recruited from AMT, and 70 were excluded for below-chance 
performance. Participants completed a learning task where they simultaneously predicted and 
observed the moral choices and basketball performance of two agents who substantially 
differed in their moral character (one bad agent and one good agent), but were equally 
competent at basketball (Fig. 4a). As in Study 4, participants received a monetary bonus for 
high accuracy.  
 
For Study 6, 408 participants were recruited from AMT, and 44 were excluded for below-chance 
performance. Participants were randomized to learn about an agent who was initially either 
bad or good, but then began to make choices that were consistently either more or less moral 
than previously. Together, this resulted in four conditions, manipulated between subjects: 1) 
bad agent becomes more moral, 2) bad agent becomes less moral, 3) good agent becomes 
more moral, and 4) good agent becomes less moral. Prior to observing any of the agents’ 
choices, participants were explicitly instructed how the average person behaved in the task. As 
in Studies 4 and 5, participants received a monetary bonus for high accuracy. 
 
In a supplementary study (referred to as Study 7 in Supplementary Materials), 125 participants 
were recruited from AMT, and nine were excluded for below-chance performance. Study 7 was 
identical to Studies 1 and 2, however instead of rating the agents’ moral character on a scale 
ranging from nasty to nice, participants rated the agents’ moral character on a scale ranging 
from bad to good. To motivate accurate predictions, participants received a monetary bonus 
for high accuracy.  
 
In a second supplementary study (Supplementary Materials, study 8), 30 participants were 
recruited from AMT to predict, in the context of decisions to profit from others’ pain, how 
“most people” choose. No feedback was provided to participants during the task, but each trial 
that participants correctly predicted the majority response was awarded as a bonus payment 
upon the completion of the study.   
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Study 1: Beliefs about bad people are volatile 
Methods 
 
 
Participants 
Study 1 took place at the Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Oxford and was 
approved by the Oxford research ethics committee (MS-IDREC-C1-2015-001). Thirty-nine 
participants were recruited from the Oxford Psychology Research recruitment scheme. Participants 
with a history of systemic or neurological disorders, psychiatric disorders, medication/drug use, 
pregnant women, and more than a years’ study of psychology were excluded from participation. 
All participants provided informed consent prior to initiation of the study and were compensated 
for their time. One participant was excluded from the analysis as their performance was below 
chance for at least one agent (<50% accuracy). Final analysis was carried out on the remaining 38 
participants. We confirm the pattern of results is similar when we include all participants in 
Supplementary Table 1 and 5. 
 
Experimental procedure 
Learning task 
We developed a novel learning task to examine the computational mechanisms of moral inference. 
In the task, participants predicted a sequence of 50 choices made by each of two agents and on 
each trial received feedback about their accuracy. On each trial, an agent chose between two 
options: more money for themselves plus more shocks for a third-party victim (Charm), or less 
money for themselves plus fewer shocks for the victim (Chelp; see Figure 1a). No a priori 
information was given about the agents. Instead, participants were required to learn about the 
agents’ moral preferences through trial and error. Participants completed the whole sequence for 
one agent before beginning with the second, and the order of agents was randomized across 
participants. Additionally, on every third trial participants rated their subjective impression of the 
agent’s character on a continuous visual analogue scale ranging from 0 (nasty) to 100 (nice). After 
making subjective character ratings, participants indicated how uncertain they were about this 
characterization on a scale ranging from 0 (very certain) to 100 (very uncertain) (see Figure 1a). 
These measures were additionally collected before participants observed either of the agents’ 
choices, in order to obtain an estimate of participants’ prior beliefs about how moral agents will 
behave in this setting. Together, this provided us with a trajectory of participants’ explicit 
subjective ratings of each agent’s moral character, and how uncertain participants were about their 
characterization, which was later used to validate findings from our computational model.  
To manipulate moral character, we created agents with different preferences towards harming the 
victim. This was operationalized as their exchange rate between money for themselves and pain 
for the victim, described with a single harm aversion parameter, κ. We previously showed that this 
parameter accurately captures individual differences in moral decision-making and correlates with 
several traits related to prosocial behavior, including empathy and psychopathy1–3.  When κ = 0, 
agents are minimally harm averse and will accept any number of shocks to the victim to increase 
their profits; as κ approaches 1, agents become maximally harm averse and will forgo infinitely 
increasing amounts of money to avoid delivering a single shock. For the learning task, we created 
one agent who was characteristically ‘bad’ (κ = 0.3), and another who was characteristically ‘good’ 
(κ = 0.7; Supplementary Figure 1). Effectively, this meant that the bad agent was less averse to 
harming the victim and would therefore require less money to inflict pain than the good agent. 
Participants observed the two agents make choices for identical trial sequences. On every trial, the 
agents faced the same two options, but because the agents had different preferences towards 
harming the victim, they often chose differently.  
Each trial contained a pair of choices [s-, m-] and [s+, m+] that matched the indifference point of 
a specific κ value. We first created a set of 24 trials where values of κ were randomly drawn from 
a normal distribution around the good agent’s indifference point (M = 0.7, s.d. = 0.15), and 
constrained such that κ < 0.95. Next, we created a set of 24 matched trials around the bad agent’s 
indifference point by subtracting each κ value from 1. We wanted participants to observe identical 
trial sequences for the two agents, but also minimize any potential differences in learning about 
the agents that could be explained by discrepancies in the informational value of the trial sequence. 
Note that a trial with high informational value for the bad agent will have relatively low 
informational value for the good agent, and vice versa. Consequently, we created pairs of trials [κ, 
1- κ] where the members of each pair were matched in informational value for the good and bad 
agent. Effectively, this meant that a trial that was highly informative about one agent’s indifference 
point was paired with a trial that was equally informative about the other agent’s indifference point 
(Supplementary Figure 4). We then randomized the order of presentation of each member of the 
pair. The pairs comprised trials 2-49 of the sequence, while the initial and final trials were fixed to 
κ = 0.5.  
Given a sequence of κ values, we then generated shock and money options for each κ value by 
generating 10,000 random pairs of positive shock movements ∆s (1 < ∆s < 20), and positive money 
movements ∆m (0.10 < ∆m < 19.90), and selected the pair closest to the indifference point of that 
κ value [∆s, ∆m]. Next, these pairs were transformed into choices containing smaller amounts of 
shocks and money (s- and m-) and greater amounts of shocks and money (s+ and m+) as follows: 
s- was a positive integer between 0 and 20, randomly drawn from a uniform discrete distribution 
with the constraint that 0 < s- + Δs < 20. Similarly, m- was a positive number between 0 and 20, 
randomly drawn from a uniform discrete distribution, rounded to the nearest 10th and constrained 
such that 0 < m- + Δm < 20. s+ and m+ were then set by adding Δs and Δm to s- and m-, 
respectively. 
We simulated the agents’ decisions by computing the utility for choosing the more harmful option 
(Vharm) as a function of the agent’s κ (κbad = 0.3, κgood = 0.7). This model is identical to the model 
that best predicts human choices in the same setting1,2. Vharm = (1 − κn)∆m − κn∆s                                                               (1) 
Where κn is the κ for agent n. A softmax function was used to transform Vharm into a probability of 
choosing the more harmful option, Pharm :   
Pharm = 11+e−β×Vharm                                                                       (2) 
Where β defines the steepness of the slope in the sigmoid function. As β approaches 0 the slope 
become increasingly horizontal, signifying a large amount of noise in the agent’s choices. As β 
approaches infinity the sigmoid approximates a step function, and indicates increasingly 
deterministic choice preferences. In Study 1 β was fixed to 100 to simulate agents that were 
completely deterministic in their choices.  
  𝑢𝑢 = [xrand < Pharm]                                                                        (3) 
Eq. (3) converts the probability of choosing the more harmful option into a binary choice, u. xrand 
is a random number between 0 and 1.   
 
Computational modelling 
Perceptual Model 
Our main goal was to assess how participants updated their beliefs about an agent’s moral character 
when that agent was either bad or good. For this purpose we applied one primary perceptual model 
to participants’ trial-by-trial responses: a reduced version of the Hierarchical Gaussian Filter 
(HGF), a Bayesian model for learning hidden states with informational uncertainty (due to a lack 
of knowledge) and without environmental volatility (See Mathys and colleagues4 for a theoretical 
background on the full model). The HGF draws on the belief that the brain has evolved to process 
information in a manner that approximates statistical optimality given individually varying priors 
about the nature of the process being predicted; effectively maintaining and updating a generative 
model of its inputs (u) to infer on hierarchically organized hidden states (see Fig.1c). For the 
purpose of this study, our model comprises only two hidden states x1i and x2i, where i signifies the 
trial index. The first state, x1, is time-varying and denotes the agent’s upcoming choice. x1 is binary 
because there are only two options that the agent can choose: the more harmful option (greater 
profit for the self and more shocks for the victim) or the less harmful option (less profit for the self 
and fewer shocks for the victim). The probability that an agent will chose the more harmful option 
(x1i = 1) versus the less harmful option (x1i = 0) is governed by the next state in the hierarchy, x2. 
x2 is a continuous state evolving over time as a Gaussian random walk, and signifies the agent’s 
(logit-transformed) κ. The hierarchical coupling between x1i and x2i explains that a participant’s 
prediction about an agent’s choice on trial i is dependent on their current belief about that agent’s 
κ, defined as a probability density. The conditional probability of x1 given x2 is described in Eq. 
(4). 
𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥1|𝑥𝑥2) = 𝑠𝑠(𝑥𝑥2)𝑥𝑥1�1 − 𝑠𝑠(𝑥𝑥2)�1−𝑥𝑥1 = Bernoulli(𝑥𝑥1; 𝑠𝑠(𝑥𝑥2))                              (4) 
Where s(·) is a logistic sigmoid (softmax) function: 
𝑠𝑠(𝑥𝑥) ≝ 1
1+exp(−𝑥𝑥)                                                                           (5) 
The temporal evolution of x2 is governed by a participant-specific parameter ω, which allows for 
inter-individual differences in belief updating. Thus, ω represents a measure of the tonic volatility 
– i.e., the extent of trial-wise changes in x2. In other words, ω captures inter-individual variability 
in the rate at which beliefs evolve over time, and consequently how rapidly people update their 
beliefs about the agent’s harm aversion. As ω approaches ∞ beliefs become increasingly unstable 
and new information is favored over prior beliefs. Conversely, as ω approaches -∞ beliefs become 
increasingly stable, so greater weight is instead placed on prior beliefs. Given ω and the previous 
value (with time index 𝑖𝑖 − 1) of 𝑥𝑥2, we now have the generative model for the current values (with 
time index 𝑖𝑖) of 𝑥𝑥1 and 𝑥𝑥2 in Eq. (6) (graphically represented in Fig.1c of the main text; for details 
see reference 3).  
𝑝𝑝�𝑥𝑥1
𝑖𝑖 , 𝑥𝑥2𝑖𝑖 , |𝜔𝜔, 𝑥𝑥2𝑖𝑖−1� = 𝑝𝑝�𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖 �𝑥𝑥2𝑖𝑖 �𝑝𝑝�𝑥𝑥2𝑖𝑖 �𝑥𝑥2𝑖𝑖−1,𝜔𝜔�                                (6a) 
with 
𝑝𝑝�𝑥𝑥2
𝑖𝑖 �𝑥𝑥2
𝑖𝑖−1,𝜔𝜔� = 𝒩𝒩�𝑥𝑥2𝑖𝑖 ; 𝑥𝑥2𝑖𝑖−1, exp(𝜔𝜔)�                                       (6b) 
Model inversion was used to optimize the posterior densities over hidden states, x1 and x2, and 
parameter ω. Participants’ posterior beliefs were represented by probability distributions with 
mean µ and variance σ. Variational Bayesian inversion yields a simple update equation under a 
mean-field approximation, where beliefs are updated as a function of precision-weighted 
prediction errors. For the present study we focus on the update at level 2 of the hierarchy5.   
  ∆µ ∝ 𝜎𝜎2𝛿𝛿1𝑖𝑖                                                                 (7a) 
with 
𝛿𝛿1
𝑖𝑖 = 𝜇𝜇1𝑖𝑖 − µ^1𝑖𝑖                                                               (7b) 
and 
𝜎𝜎2 = ?^?𝜋1𝑖𝑖
?^?𝜋2
𝑖𝑖 ?^?𝜋1
𝑖𝑖 +1
                                                                (7c) 
Where π is the precision (i.e., the inverse variance) in participants’ posterior belief 1
𝜎𝜎
 , and 𝛿𝛿1𝑖𝑖  is the 
prediction error on the trial outcome. Caret symbols (^) are used to denote predictions prior to 
observing the outcome at trial i. Thus, ?^?𝜋1𝑖𝑖 is the precision of the prediction at the first hierarchical 
level and ?^?𝜋2𝑖𝑖  is the precision of the prediction of the posterior belief. It can be shown3 from Eq. (7c) 
that prediction errors are given a larger weight when the precision of the prediction of the agent’s 
choice is high, or when the precision of the belief about the agent’s κ is low. In summary, these 
equations describe trial-wise updating of beliefs about an agent’s preference towards harming the 
victim, which approximates Bayes optimality (in an individualized sense given differences in ω) 
and determines the participant’s estimate of the probability that an agent will harm. Crucially, our 
model provides a trial-by-trial estimate of the subject’s uncertainty about the agent’s preference 
towards harming the victim. 
 
Decision Model  
The decision model describes how the participant’s posterior belief about the agent’s κ maps onto 
their predictions of the agent’s decisions (y). In the HGF, this belief µ^1𝑖𝑖 corresponds to the logistic 
sigmoid transformation of the predicted preference 𝜇𝜇2𝑖𝑖−1of the agent towards harming the victim. µ^1𝑖𝑖 = 𝑠𝑠(𝜇𝜇2𝑖𝑖−1)                                                                              (8) 
For the present study, we assumed that participants would predict others’ decisions using a similar 
rationale to how they make decisions themselves. In other words, we assumed that people’s 
preferences are described by a utility model, and that people think others’ preferences are described 
by the same model. Consequently, we applied a decision model that accurately describes human 
choices in the same choice setting1–3 (and that was also used to simulate the agent’s actual choices).  
𝑉𝑉harm
𝑖𝑖 = �1 − µ^1𝑖𝑖 � ∆m𝑖𝑖 − µ^1𝑖𝑖 ∆s𝑖𝑖                                                        (9) 
This model replaces a participant-specific parameter κ with the predicted belief derived from the 
perceptual model µ^1𝑖𝑖  to compute the value that the agent will choose Charm on trial i. The probability 
that the participant predicts Charm (y = 1) as opposed to Chelp (y = 0) is described by the softmax 
function in Eq. (10). 
𝑃𝑃harm
𝑖𝑖 = 𝑠𝑠(𝛽𝛽𝑉𝑉harm𝑖𝑖 )                                                                       (10) 
Where β is a free parameter (individually estimated like 𝜔𝜔) that describes how sensitive predictions 
are to the relative utility of different outcomes, or the prediction noise.  
 
Estimation of Model Parameters 
A crucial aspect of Bayesian inference is the specification of a prior distribution for the belief 
(listed in Supplementary Table 10). We defined the priors based on our experimental design. 
Specifically, for the current study we wanted to compare learning parameters between the two 
agents. In keeping with our experimental design, which did not give participants any basis for 
assumptions about the agent’s tendency to harm, we chose to fix the prior mean over µ2 and σ2. 
such that it amounted to a neutral prior belief about κ which was equidistant from the true value 
of the agents’ preferences. For the free parameters ω and β, we chose a prior mean that was 
relatively uninformative (with large variance) to allow for substantial individual differences in 
learning both between participants and within participants (i.e. between agents). Notably, the prior 
means on ω and β were equally unconstrained with a variance of 1. This ensured that adjustments 
in parameter estimates were not biased towards favoring one parameter over the other.  
The perceptual model parameter ω and decision model parameter β were estimated from the trial-
wise predictions using the Broyden Fletcher Goldfarb Shanno optimization algorithm as 
implemented in the HGF Toolbox (https://tnu.ethz.ch/tapas). This allowed us to obtain the 
maximum-a-posteriori estimates of the model parameters and provided us with state trajectories 
and parameters representing an ideal Bayesian observer given the individually estimated parameter 
𝜔𝜔. 
For the present study we were interested in how the computational processes during learning differ 
when observing agents with different moral preferences. Specifically, we predicted that the 
inferred morality of agents would affect how uncertain participants were in their beliefs about the 
agent’s κ and consequently the volatility of their beliefs, ω. The variance in the posterior belief 
(𝜎𝜎2) reflects a measure of uncertainty, however because it exists in logit-probability space it is not 
directly interpretable in its current form. Thus, σ2 is transformed into prior uncertainty (σT) about 
κ by appealing to the standard variable transformation rule for probability distributions 𝑝𝑝(𝑦𝑦) =
d𝑦𝑦
d𝑥𝑥
𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥). With d𝑠𝑠(𝑥𝑥)
d𝑥𝑥
= 𝑠𝑠(𝑥𝑥)�1 − 𝑠𝑠(𝑥𝑥)�, this gives us Eq. (11) 
𝜎𝜎T
𝑖𝑖 = 𝑠𝑠�𝜇𝜇2𝑖𝑖 � �1 − 𝑠𝑠�𝜇𝜇2𝑖𝑖 �� 𝜎𝜎2𝑖𝑖                                                          (11) 
We fit the model separately for participant’s predictions of the bad and good agent. This produced 
for each agent a sequence of trial-wise beliefs about the agent’s κ (µ^1𝑖𝑖 ), as well as prior uncertainties 
𝜎𝜎T
𝑖𝑖 , and two participant-specific parameters, ω and β. Where possible, we validated findings from 
the HGF model with raw behavioral data not derived from a model.  
 
Matching optimal Bayesian trajectories 
A main goal was to investigate whether observed differences in learning about good and bad agents 
reflected systematic deviations from the performance of a task-local definition of optimal Bayesian 
learning. Thus, the crucial test is whether human learning differs for good and bad agents in a 
setting where an ideal Bayesian observer learns identically about these agents. Although we took 
great efforts to minimize differences in learning that might stem from discrepancies in 
informational value of trials, it was not possible to eliminate such discrepancies completely. 
Indeed, even for an optimal observer, the only way two learning trajectories (one for each of two 
actors) could be identical is if both the trials and the choices made were identical. Thus, small 
residual discrepancies in informational value about good and bad agents across trials could 
potentially create learning differences that do not reflect a true asymmetry in learning between 
agents.  Consequently, we generated 100 permutations of trial sequences and simulated behavior 
for an ideal Bayesian observer for each (see tapas_fitModel.m and 
tapas_bayes_optimal_binary_config.m in the HGF toolbox). Two sequences were selected that 
best minimized differences in our main dependent variables (ω and 𝜎𝜎T) for an ideal observer. Each 
participant in the study was randomly assigned to complete 1 of the 2 trial sequences. With this 
process in place, we minimized the possibility that any differences between agents observed could 
be explained by the order of observations, and instead reflect a systematic deviation from optimal 
learning. 
Model comparison 
To demonstrate that the HGF model offers a reasonable description of behavior above simpler 
models, we compared our HGF model to two alternative models: (a) a Rescorla Wagner (RW) 
model, in which beliefs are updated by prediction errors with a single fixed learning rate (1 learning 
rate RW), and (b) a Rescorla Wagner model, in which beliefs are updated by prediction errors with 
separate fixed learning rates for positive and negative outcomes (2 learning rate RW). For details 
about the alternative models, see Supplementary Table 2. We verified that the log-model 
evidence (LME) indicated that our model outperforms both a simple single learning rate RW 
model and a RW model with separate learning rates for positive and negative outcomes. See 
Supplementary Table 11 for details. We validated these findings using formal Bayesian Model 
Selection, which is a random-effects procedure that takes into account inter-subject 
heterogeneity6,7. To this end, we used LME data across all studies (N = 1419) to compare between 
the HGF and our two RW models. This analysis yielded a protected exceedance probability 
indistinguishable from 1 for the HGF model for both agents, indicating effectively a 100% 
probability that the HGF model better explains the data than the other models included in the 
comparison.    
 
Statistical Analyses 
All data analysis was completed in Matlab (Mathworks). To test whether group mean parameter 
estimates and mean ratings differed significantly between good and bad agents, we used 
nonparametric statistical tests that do not make any assumptions about their underlying 
distributions. Effect sizes were computed for significant results using Rosenthal’s formula: r = 
Z/√n, which has been proposed as a viable alternative calculation when the general assumptions 
of Cohen’s formula have been violated8.  
Although we primarily focus on the difference in average uncertainty (subjective rating 
uncertainty and model parameter estimate 𝜎𝜎T) between good and bad agents, we confirmed that all 
our results are robust to controlling for the effects of time, using linear regression of the time-series 
data with agent and time as separate regressors (for results, see Supplementary Table 6).  
Results 
 
We first investigated whether we were able to recover participant’s choices using the estimates 
derived from the model. To this end, we simulated 100 sequences of choices using each 
participant’s parameter estimates and compared the simulated choices to participants’ actual 
predictions. The model fit participants’ predictions well, explaining behavior with a mean 87.0% 
accuracy for the bad agent and a mean 86.3% accuracy for the good agent in Study 1 (see 
Supplementary Table 4 for details of model goodness-of-fit for all studies).  
Next, we investigated whether participants indeed learned through trial-and-error about the agents’ 
moral preferences in the task. We analyzed the model’s final estimates of participants’ beliefs 
about each agent’s κ (µ^1107), and verified that participants formed beliefs that closely resembled the 
agent’s true κ and significantly differed from one another (mean±SEM bad: 0.322±0.004; good: 
0.681±0.004; Z = -5.373, p < 0.001; Supplementary Table 1). Subjective character ratings also 
confirmed sufficient learning by our participants; final ratings indicated the good agent was 
generally characterized as nice and the bad agent as nasty (bad: 0.427±0.040; good: 0.789±0.029; 
Z = -5.303, p < 0.001; Supplementary Table 5), where ratings above 0.5 are classified as ‘nice’ 
and ratings below 0.5 are classified as ‘nasty’.  
In line with our predictions, participants were significantly more uncertain in their beliefs about 
the bad agent on average (𝜎𝜎T) relative to the good agent (bad: 0.060±0.002; good: 0.054±0.002; Z 
= 2.302, p = 0.021; see Supplementary Table 1 for results of all studies and effect sizes). 
Subjective uncertainty ratings validated the findings from the model, as participants reported 
greater uncertainty about their characterizations for the bad agent on average (bad: 28.62 ±2.428; 
good: 20.612±1.371; Z = 3.444, p < 0.001; Supplementary Table 5). This translated into faster 
updating for the bad agent than the good agent, as demonstrated by a larger ω (bad: -3.779±0.102; 
good: -4.212±0.104; Z = 3.212, p = 0.001; Supplementary Table 1). Taken together Study 1 
suggests that moral inferences modulate the computational and cognitive mechanisms for updating 
beliefs, which may stem from a reduced reliance on priors for more threatening agents. 
In a supplementary analysis, we investigated whether observed differences in ω could be explained 
by differences in β or an overlap between β and ω. Across studies, we found no consistent 
relationship between ω and β (see Supplementary Table 12). In addition, we found no consistent 
differences in β between good and bad agents across studies (see Supplementary Table 1).  
 
 
  
Study 2: Replication, subjective uncertainty, and comparison with ideal 
Bayesian observer  
Methods 
 
Participants 
Two-hundred and fifty-three U.S. residents were recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
(AMT9). The study utilized the web application framework Ruby on Rails, and was approved by 
the Medical Sciences Interdivisional Research Ethics Committee, University of Oxford (MSD-
IDREC-C1-2015-098). Conducting the study online had the advantage of engaging a large number 
of diverse respondents outside of the University’s limited subject pool. All participants provided 
informed consent and were compensated for their time. Eighty-seven participants were excluded 
from the analysis as their behavioral performance was below chance for at least one agent (<50% 
accuracy). Final analysis was carried out on the remaining 163 participants. We confirm the pattern 
of results is similar when we include all participants in Supplementary Table 1 and 5. 
 
Experimental Procedure 
We constructed the learning task for Study 2 using identical procedures to those outlined in 
Supplementary Methods, Study 1. In order to motivate accurate predictions, participants in Study 
2 were explicitly instructed to pay attention and learn about the behavior of the agents, as they 
would later have to decide whether to trust the agents in a one-shot investment game10 that could 
earn them additional money.  
Trust Game:  After completing the learning task, participants engaged in a trust game with each of 
the agents. Participants were given ten cents that they could entrust with each agent. Any amount 
that they entrusted with the agent would be tripled, and the agent can choose how much to return 
of the tripled amount. Thus, if participants do not entrust any amount they could keep the initial 
ten cents. However, if they choose to entrust some amount of money then they might receive a 
higher amount in the end, depending on how much the agent gives back to them. We instructed 
participants that the percent returned by each agent has been predetermined, and thus the agents 
are not playing actively. We set the returned amount to correspond to the agents’ actual moral 
characters, such that the bad agent behaved more selfishly than the good agent (the bad agent 
returned 20% and the good agent returned 50% of the tripled amount). The final amount was paid 
out to participants as a bonus.  
Bad agent bonus    = (10 – amount entrusted) + (amount entrusted* 3 * 0.2) 
Good agent bonus = (10 - amount entrusted) + (amount entrusted* 3 * 0.5) 
Results 
 
As a manipulation check, we examined whether participants trusted the good agent to a greater 
extent than the bad agent by comparing the amount participants entrusted to each agent in the trust 
game. As expected, participants entrusted significantly more to the good agent (good: 7.74±0.24) 
than the bad agent (bad: 3.82±0.27; Z = -8.522, p < 0.001; Figure 2b and Supplementary Table 
7).  
Next, we investigated whether participants indeed learned through trial-and-error about the agents’ 
moral preferences in the task. We analyzed the model’s final estimates about each agent’s κ (µ^150), 
and verified that participants formed beliefs that closely resembled the agent’s true κ (bad: 
0.301±0.004; good: 0.707±0.003; Supplementary Table 1; See Supplementary Figure 5 for a 
graphical depiction of the temporal evolution of µ^1). Subjective ratings also confirmed sufficient 
learning by our participants; final ratings indicated that the good agent was generally characterized 
as nice and the bad agent as nasty (bad: 0.422±0.020; good: 0.807±0.014; Supplementary Table 
5).  
Participants were significantly more uncertain in their beliefs about the bad agent on average (𝜎𝜎T, 
bad: 0.080±0.002; good: 0.067±0.001; Z = 6.583, p < 0.001; Supplementary Table 1; see 
Supplementary Figure 5 for a graphical depiction of the temporal evolution of σT). Subjective 
uncertainty ratings validated the findings from the model, as participants reported greater 
uncertainty about their characterizations for the bad agent on average (bad: 33.078±1.329; good: 
24.087±1.371; Z = 7.213, p < 0.001; Supplementary Table 5). A generalized linear regression 
was performed to investigate whether trial-wise belief uncertainty extracted from the model (𝜎𝜎T) 
predicted participants’ subjective ratings of uncertainty. We found that the relationship was 
significantly positive as indicated by a statistical difference in the slope from zero (bad: Z = 5.778, 
p < 0.001, r = 0.433; good: Z = 8.469, p < 0.001).  
In line with Bayesian theory, greater uncertainty about the bad agent effectively translated into 
faster updating as demonstrated by a larger tonic volatility ω (bad: -3.411±0.050; good: -
3.877±0.051; Z = 6.830, p < 0.001; Supplementary Table 1). To investigate whether participants 
similarly exhibited larger updating in their subjective character ratings for the bad agent, we 
computed for each participant the absolute change in rating from trial to trial (Δrating), and 
compared the average Δrating between the two agents. As expected, the Δrating was larger for the 
bad agent (bad: 9.780±0.602; good: 7.909±0.452; Z = 2.787, p = 0.005; Supplementary Table 8), 
indicating a greater tendency to adjust moral impressions in response to new information.  
Our data showed that beliefs were more uncertain when observing a bad agent relative to a good 
agent, and this was accompanied by a faster learning rate. An additional goal of Study 2 was to 
investigate whether participants’ behavior deviated from that of an ideal Bayesian observer. 
Although we took great efforts to minimize differences in optimal learning parameters between 
agents in our trial sequences, we additionally pursued post-hoc testing as validation. To this end, 
we computed for each participant the difference in parameter estimates between good and bad 
agents for each of our main dependent measures (∆𝜎𝜎T, ∆ω) and compared this to the difference in 
parameter estimates for an optimal agent observing the same trials. We found that human learning 
in this setting significantly differed from Bayes-optimal learning, as the effective difference 
between agents was significantly greater in our sample for each of the dependent measures 
extracted from the model (∆ω: Z = -7.383, p < 0.001; ∆𝜎𝜎T: Z = -7.504, p < 0.001). 
Because, in theory, belief uncertainty is directly related to prior expectations, one possible 
explanation for why people show more uncertain beliefs about the bad agent than the good is a 
strong prior expectation that people will behave morally. However, we found no consistent 
relationship between explicitly stated prior beliefs and the difference in parameter estimate, ∆ω, 
across studies (see Supplementary Table 9 and Supplementary Figure 2 for a graphical 
depiction of the relationship between prior beliefs and ∆ω, aggregated across all studies). This 
suggests that the observed differences in uncertainty and volatility between good and bad agents 
are unlikely to be explained by prior expectations.  
In a final analysis, we asked whether behavior using a simpler reinforcement learning mechanism 
would lead to a similar pattern of results as identified in our HGF model. That is, we aimed to 
determine whether larger ω for bad agents could be recovered from behavior based on simpler 
Rescorla Wagner models. To investigate, we first extracted the average parameter estimates from 
the two Rescorla Wagner models outlined in our model comparison, Supplementary Methods, 
Study 1 (Supplementary Table 2). The first model included a single fixed learning rate and a 
noise parameter, while the second model included separate learning rates for positive and negative 
outcomes and a noise parameter. 
We next simulated behavior for 1000 fake participants on the set of trials from Study 2, whose 
parameter estimates were drawn from distributions with means equal to the extracted average 
parameter estimates and standard deviations equal to the standard deviation of those estimates. 
Next we fit our HGF model to the simulated data and checked whether our observed effect (larger 
ω for bad relative to good agents), could be recovered by fitting the behavior of ‘participants’ who 
were actually behaving in a manner consistent with either of these Rescorla-Wagner models.  
When we simulated behavior based on either Rescorla-Wagner updating process, this did not lead 
to the same parameter differences observed in our data. While our data showed larger volatility 
estimates for the bad agents than the good agents, the data simulated using the Rescorla Wagner 
models led to larger volatility estimates for the good agent than the bad agent (Single learning rate 
RW ω: bad = -4.250±0.005; good = -4.152±0.006; 2 learning rate RW ω: bad = -4.284±0.001; 
good = -4.173±0.004). Thus, in addition to the fact that the Rescorla-Wagner models do not fit 
participants’ behavior as well as the HGF model, these alternative learning models do not lead to 
the same volatility parameter differences we observed in our data. 
 
  
Study 3: Adding noise to agents’ choice behavior 
Methods 
 
For Studies 1 and 2, agents were simulated to behave deterministically, never deviating from their 
preference towards harming the victim. In other words, agents deterministically chose the more 
harmful option when 𝑉𝑉ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 in Eq. 1 was greater than zero, given the agent’s harm aversion, , 
and deterministically chose the less harmful option when 𝑉𝑉ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 was smaller than zero. However, 
human behavior is not always consistent, especially when choices become increasingly difficult 
(i.e., when 𝑉𝑉ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 is close to zero). Consequently, Study 3 investigated whether our effects would 
hold when behavior is not deterministic.  
 
Participants 
One-hundred and sixty-two U.S. residents were recruited from AMT. All participants provided 
informed consent and were compensated for their time. Study 3 was approved by the Medical 
Sciences Interdivisional Research Ethics Committee, University of Oxford (MSD-IDREC-C1-
2015-098). Twenty-seven participants were excluded from the analysis as their behavioral 
performance was below chance for at least one agent (<50% accuracy). Final analysis was carried 
out on the remaining 135 participants. We confirm the pattern of results is similar when we include 
all participants in Supplementary Table 1 and 5. 
 
Experimental Procedure 
In general, the experimental procedure for Study 3 was very similar to Studies 1 and 2 (including 
the instructions). However, in order to simulate agents that did not behave deterministically, we 
fixed β in Eq. 2 to 1.5 instead of 100. As was discussed in Supplementary Results, Study 1, β 
defines the linearity of the sigmoid function in Figure 1b. Decreasing β thus increased the linearity 
of the slope, meaning that agents often behaved in a manner that was not consistent with their harm 
aversion parameter, . 
Again, we minimized the possibility that any differences between agents observed in Study 3 could 
be explained by the order of observations using the methods described in Supplementary Methods, 
Study 1.  
 
Results 
 
Study 3 replicated all of the findings from Study 2. Again, participants were significantly more 
uncertain in their beliefs about the bad agent on average (𝜎𝜎T) relative to the good agent (bad: 
0.081±0.001; good: 0.066±0.001; Z = 7.101, p < 0.001; Supplementary Table 1). Participants 
also indicated greater subjective uncertainty in their impression of the bad, relative to good, agent 
(bad: 35.609±1.432; good: 30.858±1.665; Z = 3.896, p < 0.001; Supplementary Table 5). This 
translated into faster updating for the bad agent, as demonstrated by a larger ω (bad: -3.468±0.042; 
good: -3.974±0.043; Z = 7.296, p < 0.001; Supplementary Table 1).  
  
Study 4: Inferring morality versus competence 
Methods 
 
Study 3 demonstrated that the observed asymmetry in learning between good and bad agents is 
robust to a setting where agents’ choices are noisy rather than deterministic. A remaining question 
is whether the effect is triggered by negative impressions more generally, or specifically by 
negative impressions about moral character. We tested this in a fourth study where participants 
either inferred on agents’ high versus low morality or agents’ high versus low competence.  
 
Participants 
Two-hundred and eighty U.S. residents were recruited from AMT and randomized to either the 
morality condition or the competence condition. All participants provided informed consent and 
were compensated for their time. The study was approved by the Medical Sciences Interdivisional 
Research Ethics Committee, University of Oxford (MSD-IDREC-C1-2015-098). Thirty-one 
participants from the morality condition and twenty-nine participants from the competence 
condition were excluded from the analysis as their behavioral performance was below chance for 
at least one agent (<50% accuracy). Final analysis was carried out on the remaining 109 
participants in the morality condition and 111 participants in the competence condition. We 
confirm the pattern of results is similar when we include all participants in Supplementary Table 
1 and 5. 
An a priori power analysis indicated that the study required 104 participants in each condition to 
have 80 percent power to detect a moderate effect (0.4) in a nonparametric between-groups 
analysis. Thus, our study was sufficiently powered to observe an effect in our between-groups 
design. 
 
Experimental Procedure 
Like our previous studies, participants randomized to the morality condition predicted the moral 
choices of a bad agent (κ = 0.3) and a good agent (κ = 0.7). Instead of predicting which of two 
options was chosen by the agents, in Study 4 participants predicted whether the agents would 
accept or reject a sequence of offers of a certain amount of money at the expense of a certain 
number of shocks to the victim (Figure 3a). Thus, if the offer is accepted, the agent receives the 
indicated amount of money and the victim receives the indicated number of shocks. However, if 
the offer is rejected, the agent receives no money and the victim receives no shocks. Trial 
sequences were created in a similar manner to Study 2, where we created pairs of trials that were 
matched in their informational value for the good and bad agent (Supplementary Figure 4) and 
presented minimal differences in learning trajectories for an ideal Bayesian observer. As in Studies 
1 and 2, β in Eq. 2 was fixed to 100 to simulate agents that were completely deterministic in their 
behavior.  
In the competence condition, participants predicted whether agents would succeed or fail at scoring 
a certain number of points in a certain amount of time in a series of basketball games (Figure 3b). 
To manipulate competence, we created agents who differed in their ability to score points. This 
was parameterized as tau (τ) and represents the agent’s skill level. When τ = 0, agents are extremely 
skilled and can effortlessly score points in minimal amounts of time; as τ approaches 1, agents 
become weakly skilled and require increasing amounts of time to score a single point. We created 
the agents to behave identically to the agents in the morality condition, such that one agent had a 
low basketball skill (τ = 0.7) and the other agent had a high basketball skill (τ = 0.3). Effectively, 
this meant that the low-skill agent required more time to score each point than the high-skill agent. 
The trial sequences for the competence condition were identical to the trial sequences for the 
morality condition. Thus, accepting an offer of $15.50 in exchange for 4 shocks in the morality 
condition was analogous to successfully scoring 4 points in 15.50 minutes in the competence 
condition.  
As in the previous studies, on every third trial, participants indicated their general impression of 
the agent’s morality (or basketball skill) on a scale ranging from 0 = nasty (or beginner) to 1 = nice 
(or expert), and how uncertain they were about each impression.  
For the previous studies participants were motivated to learn about the moral character of the 
agents because they were instructed that they would later have to decide whether to trust the agents 
in a one-shot trust game that could earn them additional money. Because this motivation was less 
relevant to participants randomized to the competence condition, we chose to omit this instruction 
entirely for Study 4. Instead, participants were instructed to learn well about the 
behavior/performance of the agents because the more accurate their predictions, the more money 
they could gain. This money was paid out to participants as a bonus after completing the task. The 
trust game was additionally included at the end of the task to be used as a manipulation check (see 
Supplementary Table 7 for results).  
We chose to examine competence learning in a task focused on basketball ability, rather than 
intelligence or social ability, because past work has shown that the latter are not independent from 
moral character impressions11,12. Conversely, we expected moral character impressions to be 
independent from basketball ability. This was supported in a supplementary pilot study (N=97), 
where participants rated the moral character and athleticism of two agents who decided how much 
money they were willing to pay to prevent an anonymous victim from receiving 10 painful electric 
shocks. One agent (the bad agent), indicated that they would require $4.30, and the other agent 
(the good agent), indicated that they would require $23.40. The order that the agents were 
presented was randomized across participants. As expected, participants rated the bad agent as 
significantly less moral than the good agent (bad: 37.07±2.226; good: 81.47±2.300; Z = -8.027, p 
< 0.001), but rated the two agents similarly on athleticism (bad: 43.66±1.792; good: 44.91±1.801; 
Z = -0.260, p = 0.795).  
 
Statistical Analyses 
The main goal in Study 4 was to investigate whether the observed asymmetry in learning about 
bad versus good agents was specific to moral inference. Consequently, we computed for each 
participant the difference between good and bad agents for each of our main dependent measures 
(∆𝜎𝜎T, ∆ω, ∆ uncertainty rating) and compared this to the difference between low-skill and high-
skill agents.  
 
Results 
 
As a manipulation check, we examined whether participants trusted the good agent to a greater 
extent than the bad agent by comparing the amount participants entrusted to each agent in the trust 
game. As expected, participants in the morality condition entrusted significantly more with the 
good agent (good: 7.62±0.326) than with the bad agent (bad: 2.80±0.337; Z = -7.034, p < 0.001; 
Supplementary Table 7). Participants in the competence condition entrusted slightly more to the 
low-skill agent (low-skill: 7.65±0.507) than the high-skill agent (high-skill: 6.03±0.380; Z = 2.967, 
p = 0.003), but the difference in trust for high- versus low-skill agents was significantly smaller 
than the difference in trust for the good versus bad agents (morality, good - bad: 3.368±0.790; 
competence, low-skill - high-skill: 0.826±0.291; Z = -3.608, p < 0.001). 
Next, we investigated whether participants indeed learned through trial-and-error about the agents’ 
moral preferences in the task. We analyzed the model’s final estimates about each agent’s κ (µ^150) 
for the morality condition, and verified that participants formed beliefs that closely resembled the 
agent’s true κ (bad: 0.287±0.002; good: 0.715±0.002; Z = -9.062, p < 0.001). Final estimates about 
each agent’s τ (µ^150) in the competence condition also verified that participants formed beliefs that 
closely resembled the agent’s true τ (low-skill: 0.714±0.002; high-skill: 0.288±0.002; Z = 9.145, 
p < 0.001; Supplementary Table 1). Subjective ratings also confirmed sufficient learning by our 
participants; final ratings indicated the good agent was generally characterized as nicer than the 
bad agent (bad: 0.362±0.024; good: 0.770±0.020; Z = -8.091, p < 0.001), and the high-skill agent 
was characterized as more experienced in basketball than the low-skill agent (low-skill: 
0.153±0.017; high-skill: 0.787±0.014; Z = -9.113, p < 0.001; Supplementary Table 5).  
A rank sum test found a significant difference in ∆𝜎𝜎T between the morality condition and the 
competence condition (morality condition: 0.007±0.002; competence condition: -0.002±0.001; Z 
= 3.334, p < 0.001). Simple effects analysis revealed that belief uncertainty, 𝜎𝜎T, was significantly 
higher for the bad agent, relative to good agent in the morality condition (bad: 0.056±0.002; good: 
0.049±0.001; Z = 4.219, p < 0.001). No differences in 𝜎𝜎T were observed between agents in the 
competence condition (low: 0.049±0.001; high: 0.051±0.001; Z = -0.497, p = 0.619; 
Supplementary Table 1).  
In line with this result, the magnitude of the difference in subjective uncertainty ratings between 
agents was significantly greater in the morality condition compared to the competence condition 
(morality condition: 6.082±1.802; competence condition: -2.129±1.872; Z = 4.118, p < 0.001). 
Simple effects analysis demonstrated that subjective uncertainty was significantly greater for the 
bad agent, relative to the good agent in the morality condition (bad: 29.335±1.598; good: 
24.165±1.607; Z = 3.649, p < 0.001). No significant differences in subjective uncertainty were 
observed between agents in the competence condition (low: 18.457±1.227; high: 20.653±1.274; Z 
= -1.775, p = 0.076; Supplementary Table 5).  
The magnitude of ∆ω was also greater in the morality condition, relative to the competence 
condition (morality condition: 0.324±0.069; competence condition: 0.060±0.069; Z = 3.392, p < 
0.001). Simple effects analysis demonstrated a higher ω for the bad agent relative to the good agent 
(bad: -4.390 ±0.064; good: -4.714±0.048; Z = 4.219, p < 0.001), however there was no significant 
difference in ω between low- and high-skill agents (low: -4.726±0.047; high: -4.665±0.057; Z = -
0.574, p = 0.566; Supplementary Table 1). 
 
  
Study 5: Inferring bad moral character destabilizes beliefs about competence 
Methods 
 
We hypothesized that if asymmetries in learning are driven by inferences about immoral agents, 
rather than immoral actions, then other aspects of person perception should destabilize following 
an inference that an agent is bad. Such a mechanism would be advantageous because it is useful 
to attend to and learn about all aspects of bad people, in order to build a richer model of those who 
pose a threat. We tested this hypothesis in a fifth study, where we asked whether inferring an 
agent’s moral character as either good or bad could spill over to influence how people learn about 
that agent’s competence. Study 4 showed that people do not learn differently about two agents 
who significantly differed in basketball skill in the competence task. Thus, in Study 5 we 
implemented this same task to test whether we could manipulate learning and uncertainty about 
competence as a function of inferences about the agent’s moral character.  
 
Participants 
Two-hundred and fifty-nine U.S. residents were recruited from AMT. Participants provided 
informed consent and were compensated for their time. The study was approved by the Medical 
Sciences Interdivisional Research Ethics Committee, University of Oxford (MSD-IDREC-C1-
2015-098). Seventy participants were excluded from the analysis as their behavioral performance 
was below chance for at least one agent (<50% accuracy). Final analysis was carried out on the 
remaining 189 participants. We confirm the pattern of results is similar when we include all 
participants in Supplementary Table 1 and 5. 
 
Experimental Procedure  
Participants predicted both the moral choices and basketball performance of two agents in Study 
5. One agent was characteristically low in morality (bad) and the other was high in morality (good), 
however both agents were similarly competent in their basketball skill. Trial sequences were made 
up of 60 ‘morality’ trials and 40 ‘competence’ trials. On morality trials, participants predicted 
whether the agent would accept or reject an offer of a certain amount of money at the expense of 
a certain number of shocks to an anonymous victim. On competence trials, participants predicted 
whether the agent would succeed or fail at scoring a certain number of points in a certain amount 
of time during a basketball game.  
Trial sequences were created by interleaving morality trials with competence trials such that (a) 
participants initially predicted three of the agent’s moral choices, and (b) every second or third 
morality trial would be followed by either one or two competence trials (Figure 4a). Across trials 
we randomized whether competence trials were presented after 2 or 3 morality trials, and whether 
morality trials were presented after 1 or 2 competence trials. Subjective character and uncertainty 
ratings were collected following every third morality trial, while subjective competence and 
uncertainty ratings were collected following every third competence trial. 
The morality trial sequences were created using the same procedure as referred to in 
Supplementary Methods Studies 2 and 4, where one agent was significantly more averse to 
harming the victim (κ = 0.7) than the other (κ = 0.3) with minimal differences in learning 
trajectories for an optimal Bayesian observer. 
Although we wanted the good and bad agents to behave similarly in their basketball performance, 
we sought to ensure that behavior was not identical in the event that participants could recall the 
previous agent’s performance and thus more easily predict that of the second agent observed. 
Consequently, we simulated one agent to be slightly less competent (κ = 0.45) than the other (κ = 
0.55), and randomized across participants which competence simulation was paired with which 
agent (bad versus good). In other words, for half of the participants, the good agent was slightly 
less competent, while the bad agent was slightly more competent; for the other half, the good agent 
was slightly more competent, while the bad agent was slightly less competent. 
Competence trial sequences were created in a similar manner to morality trial sequences. We first 
created a set of 19 trials where the values of τ were randomly drawn from a normal distribution 
around one agent’s indifference point (M = 0.55, s.d. = 0.15). Next, we created a set of 19 matched 
trials around the other agent’s indifference point by subtracting each τ value from 1. Again, we 
sequentially paired trials that were matched in their informational value for each of the two agents 
(as in Supplementary Figure 4), and randomized the order of presentation of each member of the 
pair. The pairs comprised trials 2-39 of the sequence, while the initial and final trials were fixed to 
τ = 0.5. 
As in Study 4, participants were instructed to learn well about the behavior/performance of the 
agents because they would receive a financial bonus in proportion to the accuracy of their 
predictions. The trust game was additionally included at the end of the task to be used as a 
manipulation check.  
 
Statistical Analyses 
The primary goal for Study 5 was to investigate whether asymmetries in learning are driven by 
inferences about moral character, or by asymmetries in the choices that good and bad agents make. 
If the observed learning differences are driven by asymmetries in the choices that morally good 
and bad agents make, then the effects should be restricted to analysis of the morality trials where 
agents behave differently. However, if the effects are driven by immoral agents, rather than 
immoral choices, then learning differences should span across morality and competence trials. 
Consequently, we performed all analyses separately for morality trials and competence trials. We 
used two-tailed signed tests to confirm group mean parameter estimates differed significantly 
between good and bad agents on morality trials (replicating findings from Studies 1-4). A similar 
analysis restricted to competence trials allowed us to investigate whether we could independently 
manipulate how people form impressions about an agents’ competence as a function of their moral 
character.   
 
Results 
 
First, we investigated whether participants indeed learned through trial-and-error about the agents’ 
moral preferences in the task. We analyzed the model’s final estimates about each agent’s κ (µ^150), 
and verified that participants formed beliefs that closely resembled the agent’s true κ (mean±SD 
bad morality: 0.290±0.028; good morality: 0.707 ± 0.003; bad competence: 0.500 ± 0.061; good 
competence: 0.499 ± 0.061; Supplementary Table 1). Specifically, participants inferred that the 
bad agent required less money to increase shocks to the victim than the good agent (Z = -11.922, 
p < 0.001), but both agents would spend similar amounts of time to score additional points in 
basketball (Z = 0.011, p = 0.991).  Participants’ beliefs about the agents’ character also affected 
their social behavior, as they entrusted the good agent with more money than the bad agent in the 
trust game (bad: 2.70±0.241; good: 7.90±0.234; Z = -10.112, p < 0.001; Supplementary Table 
7). 
Subjective character ratings also confirmed that the bad agent was characterized as nastier than the 
good agent (mean±SD; bad: 0.346 ± 0.202; good: 0.741 ± 0.173; Z = -11.755, p < 0.001; 
Supplementary Table 5). However, despite the agents’ similar basketball performance, 
participants rated the bad agent as less skilled than the good agent (bad: 0.426 ± 0.214; good: 0.510 
± 0.237; Z = -3.061, p = 0.002). This is consistent with previous work on the halo effect, where 
impressions created about one trait spread to other traits12. Study 4 found that competence 
inference was not influenced by impressions of basketball skill. Given that Study 4 demonstrated 
that people do not learn differently about agents who drastically differ in their basketball 
competence, the observed difference in competence ratings here was not a concern for subsequent 
analyses. Thus, we can be confident that any observed between-agent differences in competence 
inference are unlikely to be attributed to asymmetries in impressions of good and bad agents’ 
basketball skill.  
Again, participants were more uncertain in their beliefs about the bad agent’s morality, both in the 
model’s uncertainty estimates derived from participant predictions (𝜎𝜎T, bad: 0.063±0.001; good: 
0.055±0.001; Z = 5.055, p < 0.001; Supplementary Table 1), and their subjective uncertainty 
ratings (bad: 27.880±1.019; good: 24.209±1.027; Z = 4.127, p < 0.001; Supplementary Table 5). 
Consequently, beliefs about the bad agent’s morality were more volatile than beliefs about the 
good agent’s morality, as demonstrated by a higher ω for the bad agent (bad: -4.116±0.046; good: 
-4.428±0.039; Z = 5.079, p < 0.001; Supplementary Table 1).  
Confirming our hypothesis, participants also formed more uncertain beliefs about the bad agent’s 
competence (𝜎𝜎T, bad: 0.065±0.001; good: 0.062±0.001; Z = 3.075, p = 0.002; Supplementary 
Table 1). This finding was also realized in participants’ subjective ratings, where they expressed 
greater uncertainty in their impression of the bad agent’s basketball skill (bad: 28.875 ± 0.955; 
good: 27.277 ± 0.992; Z = 2.323, p = 0 .020; Supplementary Table 5). Thus, it is not surprising 
that participants formed more volatile beliefs about the bad agent’s competence (bad: -4.224 ± 
0.039; good: -4.327 ± 0.034; Z = 3.030, p = 0.002; Supplementary Table 1), relative to the good 
agent, as indicated by a higher ω (Figure 4b). These findings suggest that our observation of more 
uncertain and volatile beliefs about the bad agent cannot be attributed to asymmetries in the choices 
that good and bad agents make.  
  
Study 6: Revising impressions when moral preferences change 
Methods 
 
Studies 1 through 5 show that beliefs about the morality of bad agents are more uncertain (and 
thus more volatile) than beliefs about the morality of good agents. Such results suggest that bad 
impressions are more rapidly updated than good impressions in the face of new, and potentially 
inconsistent, evidence. We hypothesized that this may reflect a mechanism by which people could 
revise their impressions of those who we infer threat by promoting cognitive flexibility in the 
service of cooperative but cautious behavior. Here, we test this prediction directly using an adapted 
version of the moral inference task. 
 
Participants 
Four-hundred and eight U.S. residents were recruited from AMT and randomized to learn about 
an agent who was initially either bad or good, but then began to make choices that were 
consistently either more or less moral than previously. Participants provided informed consent and 
were compensated for their time. The study was approved by the Medical Sciences Interdivisional 
Research Ethics Committee, University of Oxford (MSD-IDREC-C1-2015-098). Forty-four 
participants were excluded from the analysis as their behavioral performance was below chance 
for at least one agent (<50% accuracy). Final analysis was carried out on the remaining 364 
participants. We confirm the pattern of results is similar when we include all participants in 
Supplementary Table 1 and 5. 
An a priori power analysis indicated that the study required 360 participants to have 80 percent 
power to detect a small to medium interaction effect (f = 0.175) in an ANOVA. Thus, our study 
was sufficiently powered to observe an effect in our between-groups design. We pre-registered our 
sample size, experimental design, and planned analyses on the Open Science Framework 
(https://osf.io/5s23d/). 
 
Experimental Procedure  
Participants completed a modified version of the moral inference task. In the task, participants 
predicted a sequence of 36 choices made by a single agent, and on each trial received immediate 
feedback about their accuracy. Every few trials, participants rated their impression of the agent’s 
moral character and how certain they were about their impression. The study comprised a 2x2 
factorial design with moral character (bad versus good) and shift direction (improve versus 
worsen) as between-subject independent variables.  
Moral character: Between subjects we manipulated the moral character of the agent that 
participants observed (bad versus good). To manipulate moral character, we created agents with 
different preferences towards harming the victim, similar to our previous studies (bad agent: κ = 
0.3; good agent: κ = 0.7). For the first 30 trials (phase 1) participants observed the two agents make 
choices for identical trial sequences. On every trial, the agents faced the same two options, but 
because the agents had different preferences towards harming the victim, they often chose 
differently. We created the sequence of 30 trials using similar methods to those reported in 
Supplementary Methods, Study 1, and simulated how the agent chose using Equations 1-3. In 
phase 1, we asked participants to provide subjective character and certainty ratings every 1-3 trials, 
for a total of 15 ratings.  
Shift direction: Because we were interested in how participants update their impressions when an 
agent’s behavior becomes inconsistent with prior evidence, we manipulated the agents’ 
preferences on the final 6 trials of the moral inference task. For half of the participants, the agent 
became more moral than previously observed in the first 30 trials (improve condition) and for the 
other half the agent became less moral than previously observed in the first 30 trials (worsen 
condition). In the improve condition, agents became more harm-averse, and therefore required 
more money to inflict pain than previously (κ+0.2). In the worsen condition, agents became less 
harm-averse, and therefore required less money to inflict pain than previously (κ-0.2).  
For the final 6 trials (phase 2), participants observed the agents make choices that were inconsistent 
with their previous preferences. Thus, in the improve condition, agents made prosocial choices 
where they would have previously chosen antisocially. In the worsen condition, agents made 
antisocial choices where they would have previously chosen prosocially. Together, this resulted in 
four conditions, manipulated between subjects: 1) bad agent becomes more moral (bad-improve, 
κ = 0.3  κ = 0.5), 2) bad agent becomes less moral (bad-worsen, κ = 0.3  κ = 0.1), 3) good 
agent becomes more moral (good-improve, κ = 0.7  κ = 0.9), and 4) good agent becomes less 
moral (good-worsen, κ = 0.7  κ = 0.5). In phase 2, we asked participants to provide subjective 
character and certainty ratings every second trial, for a total of 3 ratings.  
In order to minimize the potential influence of prior expectations on participant predictions, we 
anchored prior expectations through explicit instruction. Specifically, we told participants that on 
average, people required $1 per shock to the victim. This prior expectation maps on to κ = 0.5 (i.e., 
equidistant from the initial preferences of the good and bad agents).  
 
Statistical Analyses 
The primary goal of Study 6 was to investigate whether participants more rapidly update their 
impressions of bad agents than good agents, particularly when agents show moral improvement. 
Consequently, we computed the magnitude that participants’ impressions updated from phase 1 to 
phase 2. The update was defined as the difference between participants’ phase 2 and phase 1 ratings 
(update = phase 2 – phase 1). For phase 1 ratings we took the average of the final 3 ratings in phase 
1, and for phase 2 ratings we took the average of the 3 ratings in phase 2. We preregistered this 
definition of the update prior to collecting data (https://osf.io/5s23d//). We conducted a 2 (agent: 
bad versus good) x 2 (shift direction: improve versus worsen) ANOVA to obtain main effects and 
interaction effects. Because our dependent measure was not normally distributed we split the data 
to complement the ANOVA with non-parametric statistics. 
 
Results 
 
First, we investigated whether our results from phase 1 of the task replicated our previous findings 
from Studies 1-5. Again, participants were significantly more uncertain in their beliefs about the 
bad agent on average (𝜎𝜎T) relative to the good agent (bad: 0.076±0.002; good: 0.063±0.001; Z = 
6.680, p < 0.001; Supplementary Table 1). Participants also indicated greater subjective 
uncertainty in their impression of the bad, relative to the good, agent (bad: 33.584±1.164; good: 
27.945±1.347; Z = 4.362, p < 0.001; Supplementary Table 5). This translated into faster updating 
for the bad agent, as demonstrated by a larger ω (bad: -3.559±0.042; good: -3.928±0.034; Z = 
6.577, p < 0.001; Supplementary Table 1). 
Next, we investigated impression updates following the agents’ shift in behavior. As predicted, we 
observed a main effect of agent on updating, where participants updated their character ratings 
more for bad agents than good agents (bad: 18.951±1.245; good: 14.928±1.316; F(1,360)=5.124, 
P=0.024; Z=3.541, P<0.001, Figure 4d and Supplementary Figure 6). In line with past work 
showing a negativity bias in impression formation, we also observed a main effect of shift 
direction, where participants updated their character ratings more when morality worsened than 
when it improved (worsen: 22.083 ±1.389; improve: 11.468 ±1.010; F(1,360)=37.698, P<0.001; 
Z=6.372, P<0.001). Finally, there was an interaction between agent and shift direction 
(F(1,360)=6.803, P=0.009; Chi-squared=57.227, P<0.001), where asymmetric updating was more 
pronounced when morality improved. 
As a secondary analysis, we compared uncertainty before versus after the shift in our 2x2 factorial 
design. Post-change, for bad agents, uncertainty remained high, regardless of whether the agent’s 
morality improved or worsened (Supplementary Figures 6 and 7; improved: Z=0.040,  P=0.968; 
worsened: Z=1.233, P=0.218). However, for good agents, uncertainty increased when morality 
worsened (Z=-5.507, P<0.001), and decreased when morality improved (Z=2.252, P=0.024). The 
more uncertain participants became about the good agent whose morality worsened after the shift, 
relative to before, the more they updated their impression about that agent (Spearman’s ρ =0.420, 
P<0.001). 
 
  
Study 7: Supplementary study verifying the observed asymmetry does not 
depend on specific labels used for character ratings 
Methods 
 
Participants   
One-hundred and twenty-five U.S. residents were recruited from AMT. All participants provided 
informed consent and were compensated for their time. Study 7 was approved by the Medical 
Sciences Interdivisional Research Ethics Committee, University of Oxford (MSD-IDREC-C1-
2015-098). Nine participants were excluded from the analysis as their behavioral performance was 
below chance for at least one agent (<50% accuracy). Final analysis was carried out on the 
remaining 116 participants. We confirm the pattern of results are similar when we include all 
participants in Supplementary Table 1 and 5. 
 
Experimental Procedure  
In general, the experimental procedure for Study 7 was very similar to Studies 1 and 2 (including 
the instructions). In this study, we tested whether any between-agent effects related to the specific 
labels that were used to rate the agent’s moral character. Consequently, participants indicated their 
general impressions of the agents on a scale ranging from bad (0) to good (1) as opposed to the 
scale from the previous studies which ranged from nasty to nice. All other aspects of the task were 
identical to those set out in Supplementary Methods study 1 and 2.  
 
Results 
 
Study 7 replicated all of the findings from our previous studies showing an asymmetry in learning 
about bad versus good agents. Participants were significantly more uncertain in their beliefs about 
the bad agent on average (𝜎𝜎T) relative to the good agent (bad: 0.058±0.002; good: 0.052±0.001; Z 
= 4.262, p < 0.001; Supplementary Table 1). Participants also indicated greater subjective 
uncertainty in their impression of the bad, relative to good, agent (bad: 29.209±1.485; good: 
24.602±1.474; Z = 3.207, p = 0.001; Supplementary Table 5). This translated into faster updating 
for the bad agent, as demonstrated by a larger ω (bad: -4.303 ±0.064; good: -4.608 ±0.060; Z = 
4.16, p < 0.001; Supplementary Table 1). Thus, we can be certain that our findings are not 
dependent on the specific labels that were used on the scale to rate the agents’ moral character.  
 
  
Study 8: Moral character or moral expectations? 
 
A reasonable explanation for why people form more uncertain and volatile beliefs about the moral 
character of bad agents, relative to good agents, is that people generally expect others to be ‘good’. 
If people have a strong prior expectation that the agents will behave morally, or more like the good 
agents in our studies, then the bad agents’ behaviors will be more surprising. To investigate this 
hypothesis, we recruited participants in an independent study that investigated how people expect 
others to behave when faced with the same moral decisions our agents faced in our previous 
experiments. 
 
Methods 
 
Participants   
Thirty U.S. residents were recruited from AMT to participate in a prediction task. All participants 
provided informed consent and were compensated for their time. Study 8 was approved by the 
Medical Sciences Interdivisional Research Ethics Committee, University of Oxford (MSD-
IDREC-C1-2015-098). 
 
Experimental Procedure  
Participants were fully briefed about our previous experiments where two participants arrive at the 
laboratory, and one of them makes decisions about whether to profit by inflicting shocks on the 
other. After observing an example trial, participants were asked to indicate how they think most 
people decided in our previous experiments. Specifically, we asked them to predict which option 
was most commonly chosen by our participants, for a set of 34 trials. Feedback was not provided 
throughout the task. Crucially, we incentivized participants to be as accurate as possible in their 
predictions, because they would be rewarded financially for every choice for which they 
successfully guessed the majority response.  
We modelled participants’ predictions using the same decision model that was used to simulate 
agent choices (Eq. 1-3), and extracted how harm averse they expected most people would be in 
this task, κe. Vharm = (1 − κe)∆m − κe∆s                                                   (12) 
 
Results 
The priors hypothesis predicts that people will expect others’ harm aversion, parametrized as κe, 
to be significantly greater than 0.5. This would demonstrate that people expect others to behave 
more similarly to the good agent than the bad agent, rendering the bad agent’s choices in our task 
less expected. In fact, our study reveals that participants expect others to behave slightly more 
similarly to the bad agent (κe = 0.445±0.043) though a one-sample Wilcoxon signed-rank test 
revealed that this was not significantly different from κ = 0.5 (Z = -1.347, p = 0.178). This study 
provides vital evidence that, at least within the context of our task, participants do not expect others 
to behave more similarly to the good agent than the bad agent.  
Below, we outline additional results that do not support the hypothesis that asymmetries in learning 
about good versus bad agents are driven by prior expectations that people will be good. 
 
Additional support against moral expectations 
 
Relationship between subjective priors and behavior: 
In Studies 2-7 we asked participants to indicate how nasty or nice they expect agents will be, prior 
to observing either of the agents’ choices. If prior expectations that agents will be ‘good’ increase 
uncertainty and volatility in beliefs about the bad agent, relative to the good, then we would expect 
to see greater between-agent differences the nicer participants think agents will be. To investigate, 
we computed for each participant the difference in belief volatility, ω, between good and bad 
agents (∆ω) and checked for correlations with subjective prior ratings. This analysis was conducted 
specifically for studies that include a within-subject manipulation of moral character (i.e., bad 
morality versus good morality).  
 
Across studies we found no consistent relationship between prior beliefs and either of these 
dependent measures (see Supplementary Table 9 and Supplementary Figure 2). No study 
showed a significant positive relationship between prior ratings and ∆ω, as would be predicted by 
the ‘priors hypothesis’. Nonetheless, to investigate the possibility that a sub-threshold relationship 
really does exist, we conducted a mini meta-analysis on the correlations across all studies that 
include a within-subject manipulation of moral character. Again, we found no evidence for a 
relationship between subjective prior expectations and the difference in belief volatility between 
agents (Z = -0.846, p = 0.398). 
 
 
Relationship between moral preferences and behavior: 
Previous work suggests that people’s expectations about others’ preferences is related to their own 
preferences15. Consequently, it’s possible that people will expect others to perform similarly to 
how they choose in the task. Prior to observing the agents’ choices in Studies 2 and 3, participants 
indicated how they would decide if they were faced with similar decisions to profit from harming 
an anonymous person. Specifically, participants made a series of 20 hypothetical decisions that 
involved choosing between less money for themselves plus less shocks for an anonymous person, 
or more money for themselves at the expense of more shocks for that person. We then fit the same 
decision model in Eq. 1-3 to estimate participant’s own harm aversion parameter (κsubject). 
 
Vharm = (1 − κsubject)∆m − κsubject∆s                                     (13) 
 
If people expect others to have similar preferences to their own, then we would expect participants 
whose preferences are nicer (i.e., larger values of κsubject) to show greater between-agent 
differences in our task, under the priors hypothesis. Participants had an average κsubject = 
0.445±0.022 in Study 2 and an average κsubject = 0.443±0.026 in Study 3. Given that people’s 
own behavior more closely resembles that of the bad agent than the good agent, it is unlikely that 
the bad agent’s behavior is more surprising than the good agent’s. In a correlational analysis, we 
find the opposite relationship between participants’ own preferences and ∆ω than would be 
predicted by the priors hypothesis. The nicer participants were, the smaller the effect of character 
on belief volatility (Study 2: ρ = -0.355, P<0.001; Study 3: ρ = -0.154, P=0.076).  
 
Relationship between generalized trust and behavior: 
A prior expectation that people are generally morally good is likely related to beliefs about others’ 
trustworthiness: the greater the expectation that people will be good, the more likely you are to 
believe others are trustworthy. In Study 1 we asked participants in a pre-testing questionnaire “To 
what extent do you feel you can trust other people that you interact with in your daily life?”. 
Participants responded on a scale ranging from 1 (very little) to 7 (very much). The priors 
hypothesis predicts that the more people generally believe that others are trustworthy, the more 
volatile beliefs will be for the bad agent relative to the good agent (larger ∆ω). In fact, we found 
no relationship between general trust and ∆ω (ρ = -0.178, p = 0.300; Supplementary Figure 3). 
In studies 2 and 3 participants completed a generalized trust scale, consisting of 6 items related to 
general beliefs about the trustworthiness and kindness of others16. For example, “Most people are 
basically good and kind” and “Most people are trustworthy”. Items were rated on a scale ranging 
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) and summed for a single measure of ‘generalized 
trust’. Again, we found no significant relationship between general trust and ∆ω in Study 1 or 2 
(Study 1: ρ = 0.065, p = 0.413; Study 2: ρ = 0.020, p = 0.817; Supplementary Figure 3). 
 
Prior expectations of basketball competence versus morality: 
Another objection to the priors hypothesis is that prior expectations about morality and basketball 
competence were very similar (morality = 56.339±1.845; competence = 54.580; Z = 0.678, p = 
0.498), yet between-agent differences in belief volatility were restricted to the morality condition. 
However, prior expectations about skill may have been weaker than those about morality. Thus, 
this does not rule out the possibility that prior expectations may influence behavior in the morality 
conditions but not in the competence condition. Consequently, we checked whether participants 
expressed greater uncertainty in their explicitly stated prior beliefs about an agent’s basketball skill 
relative to moral character. We performed this analysis first for our between-subject design, Study 
4, where participants either indicated their certainty about how skilled or how moral they expected 
an agent would be. We performed a similar analysis for our within-subject design, Study 5, where 
participants indicated their certainty in their expectations about an agent’s morality and skill. In 
both studies, we found no significant differences in how certain participants were in their prior 
expectations about an agent’s basketball skill and morality (Study 4: morality=65.092±2.355, 
competence=69.089±2.595, Z=-1.536, P=0.125; Study 5: morality=56.079±1.845 , 
competence=57.217±1.878, Z=-1.246, P=0.213).  
Two other pieces of evidence in our previous experiments argue against a priors hypothesis. First, 
a prior expectation that people will behave morally cannot explain why inferring a bad moral 
character destabilizes beliefs about basketball competence in Study 5. Second, in Study 6 we 
anchored participants to expect that most people require $1 per shock to the anonymous victim, 
consistent with a prior belief of κ = 0.5. Yet we still find that beliefs about bad agents were more 
uncertain and volatile than beliefs about good agents. Together, this evidence does not support the 
hypothesis that asymmetries in learning result from prior expectations that people will be moral. 
While we find no evidence for the priors hypothesis, future work should investigate the alternative 
hypothesis - whether inferences about threat destabilize beliefs about agents - through a direct 
manipulation of perceived threat while holding behavior constant. 
  
Supplementary Figures 
 
Supplementary Figure 1.  
 
Relationship between the harm-aversion parameter, κ, and the amount of money agents were 
willing to accept per additional shock. Money per shock is plotted against the harm aversion 
parameter, κ, which can range from 0 to 1. The bad agent requires less money per shock than the 
good agent.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 Supplementary Figure 2.  
 
Relationship between prior beliefs and the difference in volatility estimates between agents (∆ω) 
across studies 2, 3, 4 (morality condition), 5, and 7.  
 
  
Supplementary Figure 3.  
Relationship between general trust and volatility difference between agents (∆ω, higher values 
represent larger volatility for bad agent relative to good agent) for study 1. (A) ρ = -0.178, p = 
0.300, study 2 (B) ρ = 0.065, p = 0.413 and study 3 (C) ρ = 0.020, p = 0.817. 
 
 
  
Supplementary Figure 4.  
 
Graphical depiction of the optimized trial sequence. To minimize the possibility that 
differences between agents could be attributed to the order of observations we created pairs of 
trials that were matched in informational value for the good and bad agent. Each pair comprised 
trials with mirrored κ values: one member of the pair was randomly drawn from a normal 
distribution around the good agent’s indifference point, and the other member was the mirrored 
deviation from the bad agent’s indifference point (1 – κ). This resulted in a bimodal distribution 
of trials and ensured that a trial that was highly informative about one agent was sequentially paired 
with a trial that was equally informative about the other agent.   
 
 
  
Supplementary Figure 5.   
 
(A) Trajectory of model estimates of inferred beliefs (µ^) about each agent’s κ for each trial, 
averaged across all participants in Study 2 (solid lines) and for an optimal Bayesian learner (dotted 
lines). (B) Trajectory of belief uncertainty estimated by the model averaged across participants in 
Study 2 (solid lines) shows that participants are more uncertain throughout the experiment for the 
bad agent. Participants are more uncertain for both agents than for the optimal Bayesian learner 
(dotted lines), which has an identical trajectory for good and bad agents due to the symmetric task 
design.  
 
 
  
Supplementary Figure 6.  
 
Temporal evolution of subjective character ratings (A) and uncertainty ratings (B) from Study 6. 
Dashed line represents the point at which the agent’s behavior worsened or improved. In phase 1 
(to the right of the dotted line) ratings were made every 1-3 trials, for a total of 15 ratings. In phase 
2 (to the left of the dotted line) ratings were made every second trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
A B 
Supplementary Figure 7.  
Uncertainty before and after preferences shifted, Study 6. Before the agents’ preferences shifted, 
participants indicated greater subjective uncertainty about their character impressions of the bad 
agent relative to the good agent. Uncertainty remained high after preferences shifted for the bad 
agents. For good agents, uncertainty increased when morality worsened and decreased when 
morality improved. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Supplementary Tables 
 
Supplementary Table 1 provided separately here. 
  
Supplementary Table 2.  
 
Details of each learning model used. 
 
Model Notes Estimated parameters 
1 Learning rate 
Rescorla Wagner 
Beliefs are symmetrically updated, with a 
single learning rate for each participant. 
α = Learning rate 
β = Prediction noise 
2 Learning rate 
Rescorla Wagner 
Beliefs are asymmetrically updated, with 
separate learning rates for positive versus 
negative outcomes, for each participant.  
αpos = Learning rate positive outcomes 
αpos = Learning rate negative outcomes 
β = Prediction noise 
HGF 
A two level model, with one estimated 
parameter governing the volatility of beliefs 
at the second level, and a second estimated 
parameter governing the prediction noise.  
ω = Tonic volatility 
β = Prediction noise 
 
  
Supplementary Table 3.  
 
Magnitude of volatility difference; comparison between subjects and an optimal Bayesian 
learner.   
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Supplementary Table 4.  
 
Model accuracy (%)  
 
  
bad bad s.d. good good s.d. average 
Study 1* 
 
87.00 4.842 86.29 5.375 86.65 
Study 2 
 
75.00 7.996 68.70 9.561 71.85 
Study 3 
 
69.40 7.521 64.50 9.257 66.95 
Study 4 morality 77.59 7.374 78.92 8.722 78.26  
competence 80.68 9.659 77.94 6.877 79.31 
Study 5 morality 77.70 6.976 79.10 9.014 78.40  
competence 76.30 9.496 76.50 9.412 76.40 
Study 6  73.44 10.971 66.59 12.309 70.02 
Study 7  77.31 7.726 77.76 9.760 77.54    
 
 
 
 
Average 
 
77.16  75.14  76.15 
 
* Study 1 was conducted in the laboratory and included participants recruited from Oxford’s Psychology Research 
recruitment scheme. All subsequent studies were conducted online, with participants recruited from Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Because MTurk studies typically feature a larger amount of noise, the model is more 
accurate for Study 1 than subsequent studies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Supplementary Table 5 provided separately here.  
Supplementary Table 6.  
 
Linear regression investigating the effects of moral character (agent) on uncertainty controlling 
for time. 
 
Study 1 
Subjective uncertainty rating 
 
σT 
 
 
 
 
Study 2 
Subjective uncertainty rating 
 
 
σT 
 
  
 
Study 3 
Subjective uncertainty rating 
 
 
σT 
 
 
Study 4 
Subjective uncertainty rating 
 
 
σT 
 
 
 
Study 5 – morality trials 
Subjective uncertainty rating 
 
 
σT 
 
 
 
Study 5 – competence trials 
Subjective uncertainty rating 
 
 
σT 
 Study 6 
Subjective uncertainty rating 
 
 
σT 
 
 
 
Study 7 
Subjective uncertainty rating 
 
σT 
  
Supplementary Table 7.  
 
Trust Game & agent comparison. 
 
 
Amount entrusted  (mean ± SEM) Z-statistic p-value effect size (r) 
Study 2 bad: 3.82 ± 0.265 
-8.522 <0.001 0.667  good: 7.74 ± 0.243 
Study 3 bad: 3.36 ± 0.303 
-7.589 <0.001 0.653  good: 7.15 ± 0.295 
Study 4 bad: 2.80 ± 0.337 
-7.034 <0.001 0.674  good: 7.72 ± 0.326  
low-skill: 6.02 ± 0.380 
2.967 0.003 0.280  high skill: 5.19 ± 0.381 
Study 5 bad: 2.70 ± 0.241 
-10.112 <0.001 0.736  good: 7.90 ± 0.234 
Study 6 
 
bad: 
good: 
6.59 ± 0.259 
7.32 ± 0.248 -2.055 0.040 0.161 
Study 7 bad 3.79 ± 0.354  
-5.957 <0.001 0.520  good 6.97 ± 0.327 
 
  
Supplementary Table 8.  
 
Trial-wise updating of character ratings; comparison between good and bad agents. 
 
Study Bad agent Good agent test-statistic p-value 
 
mean SEM mean SEM 
  
Study 1 7.369 0.655 6.880 0.759 0.558 0.577 
Study 2 9.780 0.602 7.909 0.452 2.787 0.005 
Study 3 10.103 0.610 9.577 0.522 1.140 0.254 
Study 4, morality 8.933 0.679 6.840 0.453 2.579 0.010 
Study 4, competence 5.818 0.477 6.707 0.553 -2.299 0.021 
Study 5, morality 7.183 0.367 6.477 0.358 2.433 0.015 
Study 5, competence 6.461 0.229 5.348 0.240 5.407 0.000 
Study 6* 12.445 0.628 10.615 0.602 2.460 0.014 
Study 7 7.821 0.478 5.539 0.472 5.677 0.000 
 
*Between-subjects  
While we did not find larger impression updating for the bad agent relative to the good agent in studies 1 and 3, we 
see the same pattern of effects. A parametric meta-analysis, including the results from all within-subject studies 
(thus, excluding Study 6 and the competence condition from study 4) yielded significant results (Z = 7.461, p < 
0.001). 
 
  
Supplementary Table 9.  
 
Correlation between prior trait rating and the difference in belief volatility (Δω) between good 
and bad agents. 
 
 
Prior trait rating*  
(mean ± SEM) 
Δω correlation ρ  
(p-value) 
Study 1 
 
 n.a 
 
Study 2 
 
48.724 ± 1.610 -0.179 (0.022) 
Study 3 
 
52.007 ± 1.934 -0.029 (0.738) 
Study 4 morality 56.954 ± 1.841 0.175 (0.068)  
competence 54.955 ± 1.404 0.106 (0.268) 
Study 5 morality 61.355 ± 1.341 0.020 (0.788)  
competence 56.735 ± 1.192 0.033 (0.610) 
Study 7  60.621 ± 1.750  0.006 (0.952) 
 
*prior trait ratings are collected prior to observing any outcomes. For the morality task, participants are 
asked to indicate how nasty or nice they expect the agent to be on a scale ranging from 0 = nasty to 100 = 
nice. For the competence task, participants are asked to indicate how skilled they expect the agent to be in 
basketball on a scale ranging from 0 = beginner to 100 = expert. Study 6 was omitted from this analysis 
because this was a between-subjects, rather than within-subjects, design. Thus, we cannot compute Δω for 
Study 6.  
  
Supplementary Table 10.  
 
Prior mean and variance of the perceptual and response model parameters. 
 
Parameter Notes 
 
mean variance 
ω Constant component of the tonic volatility at the second level. Represents the temporal evolution of x2. Estimated in native space.  
-4 1 
Predictions (x1) Predictions are a sigmoid transformation of x2 , and so do not have 
prior values. 
μ1: none none 
σ1: none none 
Probabilities (x2) 
The prior mean on x2 (prior belief about agent's harm-aversion, κ) 
was fixed to a neutral point that was equidistant from the true κ 
value of both agents. Estimated in logit space. 
μ2: 0.5 0 
The prior variance on x2 was fixed to ensure that any differences in 
learning about good and bad agents derived from the model could 
not result from differences in the prior estimates. Estimated in log-
space.  
σ2: 0.35 0 
β 
Constant component that describes how sensitive prior beliefs are to 
the relative utility of different outcomes, or the prediction noise. 
Estimated in log-space. 
 1 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Supplementary Table 11.  
 
Model comparison. Sum log-model evidence (LME) for each study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
HGF 1 learning rate RW 
2 learning rate 
RW 
Study 1 -1662.70 -1855.68 -1905.96 
Study 2 -7599.38 -7849.20 -7759.33 
Study 3 -7291.61 -7543.39 -7099.73 
Study 4 morality -4050.18 -4820.50 -5230.21 
Study 4 competence -3983.84 -5315.96 -5791.98 
Study 5 morality -8149.24 -9252.11 -9916.40 
Study 5 competence -6021.07 -7167.02 -8085.64 
Study 6 -5361.11 -5567.04 -5568.75 
Study 7 -4375.62 -4859.85 -5250.32 
 
Total -48494.75 -54230.75 -56608.30 
 
Supplementary Table 12.  
 
Correlation between model free parameters ω and β. Analysis investigating (a) the relationship 
between ω and β for the bad agent, (b) the relationship between ω and β for the good agent, (c) 
the relationship between Δω and Δβ between good and bad agents 
 
 
Bad agent Good agent Bad - Good 
Study ρ P ρ P ρ P 
Study 1 0.002 0.992 -0.008 0.960 0.315 0.055 
Study 2 0.272 0.000 0.316 0.000 0.472 0.000 
Study 3 0.288 0.001 0.156 0.072 0.338 0.000 
Study 4, morality -0.292 0.002 -0.434 0.000 -0.229 0.017 
Study 4, competence -0.331 0.000 -0.408 0.000 -0.171 0.071 
Study 5, morality -0.131 0.073 -0.039 0.596 0.098 0.180 
Study 5, competence -0.288 0.000 -0.253 0.000 0.016 0.830 
Study 6* 0.363 0.000 0.118 0.117 n/a n/a 
Study 7, morality condition -0.175 0.061 -0.507 0.000 -0.039 0.673 
 
 
*Because Study 6 is between-subject and we did not have a within-subject manipulation of agent, we cannot 
compute the difference between agents (Δω and Δβ).  
 
